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This paper analyses the performance of foreign born male individuals on the British labour 
market. Using data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey over the period 1992-2009, we 
find consistent evidence of positive economic assimilation of immigrants, with their labour 
market outcomes improving with duration of stay in the country. We also find that the 
performance of individuals who came to the UK to complete their education is significantly 
higher than that experienced by labour market entrants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Immigration has always been a highly debated and very sensitive issue. With the steady 
growth of international human capital movements, natives seem to call more and more for 
restrictive immigration policies, while on the other side, economic considerations generally 
think about migrants as a resource. The friction between economic and political concerns can 
be somehow limited, increasing the capability of migrants to positively contribute to the host 
economy; this contribution is strongly linked to their performance on the labour market, and 
on their ability to support themselves. It is therefore in the interest of the host country to 
facilitate the process of economic assimilation of the foreign born population. 
Following this line of research, this paper investigates the labour market performance of 
foreign born male individuals in the UK over the period 1992-2009, using data from the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The framework for the research concerning the earnings and labour market behaviour of 
immigrants is generally provided by human capital theory, where workers’ performance in the 
labour market reflects their human capital endowment. The basic hypothesis is that migrants 
experience an initial labour market disadvantage, due to the imperfect transferability across 
countries of knowledge and skills acquired at home, which may include education, training, 
cultural characteristics, language proficiency, labour market information. This provides 
incentives for the migrant to invest in country-specific skills, or to increase transferability of 
those previously acquired. In both cases, the result will be that with duration of stay in the 
destination country, the outcomes of the foreign born gradually adjust towards those of native 
workers, through human capital enhancement.  
The degree of economic assimilation of migrants has been heavily researched, starting from 
the 1970s with the path-breaking work of Chiswick (1978), who investigated the pattern of 
convergence of immigrant earnings in the U.S. to those of the native population. The evidence 
he provides suggests the existence of a positive assimilation process, with immigrants’ 
earnings eventually overtaking those of the native workers at a later stage of the migration 
cycle. This result of an economic assimilation is confirmed by several other cross-sectional   2
studies of the time, including Borjas (1982). This type of analysis, however, can be very 
sensitive to changes in the initial position of migrants who arrive at different points in time, 
i.e. to unmeasured quality differentials among subsequent immigrant cohorts. This makes it 
crucial to carefully distinguish the true assimilation pattern from these ‘cohort effects’, an 
issue that becomes particularly relevant when relying on multiple cross-sections to estimate 
what is actually a longitudinal effect. This is exactly the concern that pressed Borjas (1985) to 
move on to a revised methodology, which involves the decomposition of the standard cross-
section growth of earnings in two parts, where the first element is the ‘within-cohort’ growth 
(i.e. the growth of immigrant earnings of a cohort over time, which measures the convergence 
or divergence to the earnings profiles of the natives), and the second one is the ‘across-cohort’ 
growth (i.e. the growth in earnings experienced by different cohorts at the same point of their 
life cycle in the host country). The study, which is therefore carried out within immigrant 
cohort, shows that the assimilation rates were in fact heavily overestimated in the early 
studies due to a decreasing quality of successive arrival cohorts; the growth rate of 
immigrants’ earnings is generally found to be not high enough to allow foreign-born 
individuals to fill the initial gap.  
This interpretation, and the findings of decreasing immigrant quality and slower assimilation, 
have been questioned by a number of studies though; analyses that followed individuals or 
cohorts over time showed that the assimilation profiles of immigrants actually resembled 
those indicated by the first cross-sectional estimates. Duleep and Regets (1997), using data 
from the U.S. Current Population Survey that allows them to follow individuals for one year, 
find that the wage growth of the foreign-born does exceed that of natives, and that the actual 
wage growth of migrants relative to natives is close to that predicted by a cross-sectional 
analysis. Lalonde and Topel (1992) use data from the 1970 and 1980 Census of Population to 
reexamine the evidence on intragenerational assimilation of immigrants in the U.S. and 
changes in the cohort quality; following cohorts over time, they find again a strong evidence 
of assimilation, with estimates resembling those from the cross-sectional analysis, and 
therefore conclude that no relevant evidence of declining quality of successive immigrant 
cohorts can be found for the immigrant groups they study
1. Using longitudinal data for 
Australia, Chiswick et al. (2005) show that cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses generate 
similar findings. 
                                                 
1 They point out, however, that the overall quality of immigrants did actually decline, because of the shift in the 
ethnic composition of the new immigrants to the U.S.   3
Studies on the economic assimilation profiles of immigrants have been carried out not only 
for the U.S., but also for a number of other countries. Hayfron (1998) finds for Norway results 
that are similar to those of Borjas (1985) for the U.S. Aguilar and Gustafsson (1991) and 
Hammarstedt and Shukur (2006) show that the assimilation profiles in Sweden vary widely 
between different immigration cohorts and between migrant groups coming from different 
regions. Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) and Fernández and Ortega (2008) find the 
same result for Spain. Antecol et al. (2006) compare Australia, Canada and the U.S., 
concluding that assimilation is more likely to take place through quantities (i.e. employment) 
in Australia, while through prices (i.e. earnings) in the U.S., with Canada falling in between. 
Chiswick et al. (2005), on the other hand, find evidence of a positive earnings assimilation in 
Australia as well. 
Baker and Benjamin (1994) indentify very small assimilation effects for immigrants on the 
Canadian labour market, and in some cases even a negative assimilation. This result is 
somehow confirmed by Bloom et al. (1995), who find that while assimilation took place for 
earlier cohorts, it has been slower or even negative for more recent ones. Using panel data, 
Hum and Simpson (2004) find evidence suggesting that immigrants never fill the negative 
wage gap they experience upon entry in the host country.  
The evidence of a negative immigrant assimilation is not uncommon in the literature, despite 
the strong empirical support for the standard model. Bell (1997) finds this result for white 
immigrants in the UK. Dustmann et al. (2003) find the same for Irish and Europeans. Clark 
and Lindley (2009) find negative assimilation for earnings of all foreign-born individuals, and 
for the employment probability of white immigrants. Chiswick and Miller (2008) try to 
outline the conditions under which this unexpected result can still fall within the traditional 
assimilation model; they argue that ‘where countries are of approximately equal economic 
standing, and skills are highly transferable internationally, international migration will 
typically occur where the individual experiences a favourable draw from the distribution of 
wages offers in the potential destination relative to the wage available in the country of origin 
[…]. A relatively high wage offer that attracts the immigrant need not persist indefinitely. 
With the passage of time, a ‘regression to the mean’ would be expected, which will be 
captured by a negative relationship between earnings and duration of residence in the 
destination’. Other papers suggest that this evidence can be explained by factors related to the 
labour market, for example a reduced capacity to absorb particular groups of individuals, 
especially the low skilled (Bloom et al., 1994). Family migration models have been developed 
to try to answer this question: Baker and Benjamin (1997) find evidence in favour of the   4
‘family investment model’, according to which ‘wives in immigrant families take on ‘dead-
end’ jobs to finance their husbands’ investment in human capital’, but then they reduce 
participation or even drop out of the labour market as the husbands’ economic outcomes 
improve.  
A part of the literature has focused on the UK as well. Both Chiswick (1980) and Bell (1997) 
find an earnings disadvantage for black immigrants, but while the former finds no evidence of 
assimilation with duration of stay, the latter – relying on a larger dataset – does, despite 
concluding that a gap remains throughout their working lives. Neither of these studies finds 
that white immigrants experience any economic disadvantage. The conclusion that race 
matters more than being born in the country or elsewhere is drawn by several studies. 
Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) and Dustmann et al. (2003) conclude that employment and 
participation rates of immigrants from ethnic minority groups are considerably lower than 
those of natives, with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – especially women – suffering a particular 
disadvantage, while the patterns for white immigrants tend to be more similar to those of the 
natives. However, Dustmann et al. (2003) find that there is some assimilation process taking 
place for minority immigrants. Evidence of assimilation is found by Wheatley Price (2001) as 
well. Using decomposition analysis, Blackaby et al. (1994) find substantial employment and 
earnings differentials even between whites and British-born ethnic minorities
2, confirming 
that nonwhite minorities appear to face substantial discrimination; they show that the position 
of these groups declined further between the 1970s and 1980s, while Blackaby et al. (1998) 
demonstrate that it improved slightly in the 1990s, with Indians performing better than 
Pakistanis and Blacks.  
A different assimilation profile for white and nonwhite immigrants is highlighted by Shields 
and Wheatley Price (1998) and Clark and Lindley (2009) as well. They also investigate 
whether the return to education changes depending on where it has been acquired, the UK or 
abroad; Shields and Wheatley Price (1998) find that education obtained in a foreign country 
tends to be less valuable on the labour market; Clark and Lindley (2009) show that highly 
qualified nonwhite immigrants who hold a British qualification have labour market outcomes 
that are comparable to those of white immigrants, while those who do not have a significant 
performance gap with respect to their white counterparts. 
 
 
                                                 
2 According to Blackaby et al. (2005), though, this might partly be due to these groups adopting a ‘taste for 
isolation’, rather than only be the consequence of some discrimination on the labour market.    5
3. Data 
 
The data used for our analysis are drawn from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a continuous 
sample survey of households living at private addresses in Great Britain which has been 
carried out since 1973. We choose to use data from 1992, when the survey took its current 
form of a quarterly survey (Quarterly Labour Force Survey, or QLFS). The sample includes 
about 59,000 responding addresses per quarter, with 138,000 individuals responding. Each 
address is interviewed for five waves, with interviews taking place every three months, 
thereby having the last interview one year after the first one. This of course introduces a panel 
component in the survey, but it is not possible to follow individuals over time. Information 
about income is collected only in the fifth wave until winter 1996, and in the first and fifth 
waves from spring 1997. We therefore choose to consider only individuals who are being 
interviewed in Wave 5
3, ending up with a pooled cross-section covering the period 1992-
2009
4, allowing us to ignore any panel data issue. 
For our analysis, we focus on male individuals in the labour force aged 20-45. This selected 
sample includes about 265,000 individuals, 8.87% of which are foreign-born
5.  
 
                                                 
3 No data about income seem to be available in the first quarter of 2004 though; for this reason, we choose to 
include in the sample also Wave 1 from January-March 2003, which covers the same individuals we would find 
in Wave 5 in the data about January-March 2004. 
4 We created the variables we use in the analysis building on the available QLFS data. However, the content of 
the interviews, as well as the names and coding of the variables in the surveys, changed over time, so that it was 
impossible to rely on the same variables throughout the whole period. We took this into account while 
generating our own variables, to ensure that information on which our study is built is reliable. 
5 According to the estimates of the Annual Population Survey, in the year to December 2008 11% of the UK 
population was born outside the UK. 
   6
 
Figure 1 shows the historical pattern of arrival of the immigrants in the sample. Only 3.18% 
of the foreign-born individuals arrived before 1960; 30% of our sample arrived between the 
mid-1960s and the early 1980s. We can see, however, that a large part of the sample we 
consider is made up of relatively recent arrivals, as above 40% of the immigrants studied 
arrived in the 1990s and early 2000s
6. 
 
As emerges from Figure 2, the first immigrants, who started to arrive shortly after the end of 
the war, were mainly whites, who continued to come to the UK quite constantly. Individuals 
of other ethnic groups prevalently arrived after 1960, with a peak for blacks in the early 
1960s. In the 1970s, we find a migration wave coming from India, followed by a wave of 
blacks again. The arrival of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis started only in the late 1960s, but has 
remained steady since then. 
 
                                                 
6 We need to remember that this figure does not show exactly what we can consider an historical pattern of 
inflows, as for this purpose we would need to take into account mortality and outmigration as well. Instead, it 
shows the pattern of foreign-born residents.   7
 
We now compare a range of characteristics of foreign- and native-born individuals in our 
sample, highlighting some of the main figures about the various groups. For this purpose, we 
also split the groups into whites and nonwhites, and compare some statistics at the beginning 
and at the end of the time span we cover in the analysis, 1993 and 2008
7. The figures are 
presented in Table 1.  
As we can see in Panel A, the share of immigrants in the labour force in our sample has 
doubled from 1993 to 2008. The share of nonwhites in the sample has increased from 5.29 to 
almost 10% over these 15 years. 
The median age has seen a small decline for the immigrants, while has increased for the 
natives (in particular for the nonwhites). 
In 1993, the share of highly educated individuals was much higher for migrants than for the 
natives; this confirms the well-known fact that immigrants tend to be on average more skilled 
than the natives. Over the period, all groups have seen an increase in the share of individuals 
holding a degree; however, this increase has been very small for white immigrants, quite 
significant for nonwhite immigrants and white natives, but also incredibly high for nonwhite 







                                                 
7 We prefer to use these years than 1992 and 2009 as these do not have data for all four quarters.   8
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of separate samples of individuals (men, age 20-45) 
        
Panel A       
  Native born  Foreign born 
 Whites  Nonwhites Whites  Nonwhites 
Percentage of the total sample  
1993  90.88 1.51 3.82 3.78
2008  82.66 3.14 7.58 6.62
Median age  
1993  33 27 34 35
2008  34 32 33 34
Median n. of years since migration  
1993  20 17
2008  11 11
Median age at arrival   
1993  14 18
2008  21 23
Share of individuals holding a   
1993  0.1567 0.1655 0.2393 0.2043
2008  0.2483 0.3705 0.2497 0.2778
Employment rate   
1993  0.8887 0.7230 0.8783 0.8173
2008  0.9503 0.8774 0.9653 0.9140
   
   
Panel B    
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
    
% of education entrants 95.36  77.95 40.25 13.89    5.07
     
Source: LFS 1992-2009.               
 
For both the foreign and the native born, the employment rate is constantly lower for 
nonwhites; the performance of all whites is similar, starting from around 88% at the 
beginning of the period, to go over 95% in 2008; nonwhites started from a lower level, but 
while nonwhite immigrants have only slightly narrowed the gap with white immigrants, 
nonwhite natives have gone from -17% to -7%. 
In 1993, the average white and nonwhite immigrant had already spent 20 and 17 years 
respectively in the UK; in 2008, for both groups, only 11 years. On the other hand, the median 
age at arrival has significantly increased over time. 
This is somehow confirmed by the share of education entrants (i.e. individuals who arrive to 
complete their education in the country and enter the labour market only after that) in the 
foreign-born population, as opposed to labour market entrants (i.e. individuals who arrive in 
the UK to enter the labour market), share that we present in Panel B. In our sample, the 
percentage of education entrants – who of course tend to arrive at an earlier age – in our 
sample who arrived in the 1960s was incredibly high; cohort after cohort, however, the share   9
has been steadily declining. Given that our sample is composed of individuals who are in the 
labour force already, the share of the last two cohorts is probably underestimated, since a part 
of the immigrants who arrived in those decades might still be studying, therefore being 
excluded from our analysis. Even so, the historical pattern is quite clear, and can be explained 





The analysis carried out in the paper relies on the standard assumptions of the human capital 
literature, and needs to deal with the major shortcomings in data availability that this kind of 
study always faces. One of the assumptions that might turn out to be less credible is that 
labour market experience isn’t accrued until education is complete; the type of data available 
generally does not allow to ascertain whether this is the case or not; we try to limit the extent 
to which the first problem can bias our estimates by dropping observations for which the age 
at which full-time education was left is implausibly high (above 45). Analogously, data do not 
allow to identify true labour market experience, which in the literature is practically measured 
by potential experience. Surely, there are groups of individuals whose labour force 
participation tends to be more continuous over the life cycle, in which case the use of 
potential experience should not represent a major concern. This needs not be true for 
everybody though: for example, it’s a well known fact that women tend to have a more 
fragmented employment history than males. For this reason, we decide to limit our analysis to 
the male population, like several studies do (Bell, 1997; Wheatley Price, 2001; Clark and 
Lindley, 2009; and many others) 
 
We investigate two labour market outcomes of migrants, namely employment (i.e. the 
occurrence that the survey respondent is in paid employment at the time of the interview
8) and 
earnings (measured as gross hourly wage, and expressed in logarithms). The sample includes 
only male individuals who are part of the labour force. 
 
The basic model we consider to be relevant for the analysis is the following one: 
                                                 
8 The definition of employment used in the QLFS variable considered, which follows the ILO definition, 
includes individuals who are employees, self-employed, engaged in government employment and training 
programmes, and unpaid family workers. This last category accounts for only 0.10% of the sample though.   10
s s s t N i D YSM EXPERIENCE x Z i
t
it t i i i i 2000 ,..., 1950 , 1940 , ,..., 1 , = = + + + + = ∑ ε φ δ γ β  
where  Zi is the measure of labour market outcome taken into consideration (either 
employment or earnings) for individual i, xi is a vector of socioeconomic variables we will 
explain in more detail later, YSM is the number of years since migration, exper is the 
(potential) working experience, and D are cohort dummies indicating whether the immigrant 
arrived in a particular decade (d40, d50, d60, d70, d80, d90 and d00). 
 
Years since migration (YSM) is the measure of the time spent in the British labour market by 
the foreign-born individual, and is typically used to identify the assimilation effect. This 
variable needs to be handled carefully though: while simply meant to capture the effect of the 
duration of residence in the destination country, it can generate an estimation bias arising 
from two different types of problems, both connected to the ‘use of a cross-section regression 
model to explain a dynamic series of events’, as Borjas (1985) explains.  
First of all, we need to consider that a selective out-migration can occur; if the most 
successful immigrants tend to remigrate, there will be a downward bias on the estimated 
assimilation profiles; on the other hand, if immigrants performing worse in the labour market 
are those who decide to leave the country, the coefficient of the YSM variable might be biased 
upward. In any case, given the lack of emigration data, this is an issue for which very little 
can be done.  
Secondly, we have what Borjas (1985) calls the problem of the ‘dynamic interpretation of the 
cross-section coefficient’ of YSM, with its ‘implicit assumption that the average ‘quality’ of 
successive cohorts of immigrants is not changing over time’. Again, an estimation bias may 
arise, upwardly if the quality of immigrants arriving in the UK is decreasing, and downwardly 
if for example more selective migration policies lead to higher quality entries. We include a 
set of arrival cohort dummies to control for this issue. 
 
We include among the explanatory variables socio-demographic indicators, regional dummies 
and time effects (dummies for quarter when interview took place, to control for seasonality).  
The first group includes marital status (married), dummies for the presence of children aged 
0-4, 5-9 and 10-15 (dkid04, dkid59, dkid1015), and education. Earnings regressions include a 
dummy, pt, equal to 1 if the individual works part-time. 
We decide to control for education (and hereby for human capital) including dummies for the 
level of the highest educational qualification attained. The exact type of qualification is   11
generally traceable in the datasets, and the variable is normally reliable for natives and 
education entrants. There is a problem involving labour market entrants though, since foreign 
qualifications are generally coded as ‘other qualifications’ whatever their level
9. For this 
reason, in this case and when data on higher qualification are missing due to seasonal-to-
calendar quarter change
10, the level of higher qualification has been inferred starting from 
years of schooling. Although this is surely not an exact measure, we believe that years of 
schooling – another measure of human capital often used in the literature – would not be 
either, since this variable is just computed as age when completed full time education -5, and 
therefore it does not really prove that a particular educational level has been achieved. For this 
reason, using years of schooling for all the individuals would imply a loss of exact 
information for those for whom we do have data collected in the QLFS; we therefore choose 
to rely on this corrected version of the highest qualification variable. Following Dustmann 
and Fabbri (2005), we include in the model three dummy variables, degree (indicating 
whether the individual has a first or higher degree or other degree-level qualification), a_level 
(if the individual’s highest qualification is below degree level, i.e. A-level or equivalent), and 
o_level (if the individual has O-levels or equivalent, or other professional-vocational 
qualifications). 
We choose not to include among the socio-demographic characteristics in the immigrants’ 
regression an age variable, since a problem of multicollinearity would arise, given the 
contemporaneous presence of a variable capturing experience
11. 
 
As explained in Section 2, different studies have resorted to different methodologies to 
analyse the assimilation pattern of immigrants. The key variable is generally the number of 
years of residence in the country, and several methods have been used to make sure that it 
captures a true assimilation effect. We believe that different groups of individuals show 
different employment and earnings behaviours, and different responses to the range of 
characteristics affecting labour market performance. We therefore try to control for this 
heterogeneity of the immigrant population by introducing more flexibility, running 
                                                 
9 When considering the variables included over time in the QLFS about the higher qualification achieved, we 
find that the percentage of natives and education entrants holding ‘other qualifications’ is around 6-7%, but the 
share is much higher, above 40%, for labour market entrants, sign that in many cases foreign qualifications are 
not recorded as the equivalent British one. 
10 The QLFS operated on a seasonal quarter basis at the beginning; in May 2006, in accordance with EU 
legislation for data for Eurostat, a switch from seasonal to calendar quarters took place; this also allowed to 
enhance comparability with other surveys mostly conducted on this basis. Following the 2007 LFS Reweighting 
Project, all previous calendar versions of QLFS have been adjusted accordingly. 
11 In our sample, there is a 93.72% correlation between age and experience.   12
regressions on subsamples of individuals, so that we can achieve an increased homogeneity 
within each group. We generally disaggregate immigrants along two different dimensions, 
where the first one is always ethnicity (white and nonwhite
12). This is a standard division that 
many studies on this topic use. A subsequent subdivision is done either by level of education 
(where highly educated individuals are defined as those who have a higher education 
qualification, either at degree or below degree level), or on marital status
13.  
 
A relevant issue that is critical to the subject is that immigrants can differ in a fundamental 
aspect, that is the age of arrival in the UK. About 40% of our immigrant sample arrived in the 
country when aged 16 or below. This surely entails different adaptation processes, as 
individuals who came as children have probably been able to seize different types of 
opportunities when compared to adult immigrants, first of all because they participated in the 
British educational system. This might determine for example wage patterns that are closer to 
those of the native population. 
Several studies do not take this aspect into consideration (for example, Bell, 1997; Borjas, 
1985). Other papers have dealt with the issue in different ways. Antecol et al. (2006) simply 
exclude individuals for whom entry in the destination country is supposed to have taken place 
before the age of 16. Dustmann et al. (2003) include in the regression a dummy for the 
immigrant being 16 or below when entering the country. Wheatley Price (2001) uses 
regressors that separate education and working experience acquired in the UK and abroad. 
Following Clark and Lindley (2009) (and, partially, Wheatley Price, 2001), we therefore 
make the additional distinction between labour market and education entrants. To do this, the 
sample of foreign-born individuals is divided according to whether the migrant left full time 
education before or after arrival in the UK. Labour market entrants will have both foreign 
experience and experience acquired in the UK, while they completed education in the country 
of origin. On the other hand, education entrants will have work experience accrued only in the 
UK, and their highest educational qualification will be a British one. Due to sample size, we 
make this distinction only on white and nonwhite subsamples. 
The attempt to work on more homogeneous samples is also one of the reasons why we choose 
to limit our analysis to individuals aged 20-45; on the other side, this choice allows to rule out 
the possibility that issues such as early retirement affect our estimates. 
                                                 
12 Any further disaggregation among non white individuals (e.g. between Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and 
other non whites) would generate samples that are too small to provide significant results. 
13 Again, given that the group of immigrants in the sample is made up of about 23,500 individuals only, we 
cannot run regressions on samples with a higher level of disaggregation.   13
We run regressions on the native sample as a term of comparison. 
 
Different econometric methods have been used in the literature to analyse the employment 
propensity of individuals. Since the dependent variable is binary and its relationship with the 
explanatory variables is non-linear, a simple Linear Probability Model would be inappropriate 
as it would provide predicted probabilities of employment that lie outside the interval (0,1), 
and because it would create problems for testing hypothesis, as the disturbance terms are by 
definition not normal
14. We choose to use Probit regressions to analyse the employment 
propensity of individuals, so that the conditional expectation is bounded between zero and 
one. 
As far as the analysis of earnings is concerned, an issue that arises is that we have to deal with 
a potential sample selection problem. While data on the explanatory variables is available for 
the entire sample, we have information on wages only for individuals in paid employment, 
and this subsample is potentially non-random. This is obviously a case of truncation, and in 
particular of incidental truncation, where the observability of the dependent variable is the 
result of the outcome of another variable; in the specific case, the occurrence of being in paid 
employment (emp=1), as of course wages are not observed for non-working individuals. This 
would imply the presence of a sample selection bias, and a simple linear regression would 
generate non consistent estimators for the parameters
15.  
We choose to deal with these issues by using the Heckman Selectivity Model, a procedure 
suggested by Heckman (1979) to obtain consistent (although not efficient) estimates of the 
parameters of the Selectivity model.  
Starting from a structural relationship for the Selectivity model in terms of a latent 
relationship of the form 
i i i u x wage + ′ = β
*  
with an additional latent relationship for the observability of wagei as 
i i i v z emp + ′ = γ
*  
where xi are the regressors for the earnings equation and zi are the explanatory variables for 
the latent variable equation for employment, and given the observability criterion 
) 0 ( 1 .
* * > = i i i emp wage wage , 
                                                 
14 Another issue concerning disturbance terms is that they would be heteroskedastic by construction, but this is a 
problem that could be easily dealt with simply using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
15 ‘Wage or earnings functions estimated on selected samples do not, in general, estimate population (i.e. random 
sample) wage functions’ (Heckman, 1979).   14
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= ′  is the Inverse Mills ratio (IMV), or hazard rate. 
Building on this, Heckman (1979) suggests a two-stage estimation procedure, where in the 
first step a Probit regression is used on the entire sample to model the discrete choice in the 
selection equation (in our case, employment or unemployment). The estimated parameters are 
then used to obtain the IMV, the sample selection correction term, which is included as an 
additional explanatory variable in a second-stage linear regression estimation of the structural 
relationship on the selected sample of non-censored observations, i.e. in the estimation of our 
wage equation. This allows to make sure that the error has zero mean, so that a simple OLS 
regression for the wage equation will yield consistent estimates. Without the inclusion of this 





We run regressions starting from the base model, and then progressively including a quadratic 
in both exper and YSM (rescaled dividing by 100), and interaction terms of these variables 
(again divided by 100). We show here regressions where we use five combinations of these 
key measures, namely equations including (A) exper and YSM; (B) exper,  YSM and 
YSM*exper; (C) exper,  exper
2 and YSM; (D) exper,  exper
2,  YSM,  YSM*exper and 
YSM*exper






We then perform Likelihood Ratio, Wald and F-tests to decide among the different 
specifications. In particular, we test exclusion restrictions of the coefficients of YSM*exper 
and YSM*exper





Model (E), to compare them to Model (C). 
 
 
5.1 Employment    15
 
The main result of this part of the analysis is the clear and robust pattern of the coefficient of 
YSM, which is positive and significant throughout the different combinations of variables and 
interactions included, although generally losing significance – as all the other measures – 
when the full set of interactions between the variables and their quadratics are used. Given 
that we control for cohort quality
16, this is a remarkable result, which corroborates the 
hypothesis of a positive economic assimilation of migrants with residence in the destination 
country.  
As we can see in Tables 2-3, the marital status is always relevant in explaining the 
employment rates of immigrants. Married individuals consistently show a better performance 
on the labour market. 
Altogether, having children appears to reduce the probability of employment, probably 
because it affects the participation rate of individuals. This seems to be true especially for 
immigrants who have children aged 0-4 and to affect low-educated individuals in particular. 
This result is somewhat counterintuitive, since we are studying the performance of male 
individuals only, and we would expect that having children – in particular in pre-school age – 
negatively affects the participation decision of women, while potentially rising that of men. 
However, only an analysis of the participation decision within the household would be able to 
give us a greater insight into the mechanisms that are at work here. 
 
                                                 
16 The evidence concerning the cohort effect is somewhat more contradictory. The problem here is that the 
coefficients of the dummies surely depend on the reference cohort, which is generally set to be the first one, the 
cohort of individuals who arrived before 1950. This is, however, a rather small and potentially highly selected 
group. Furthermore, given the disaggregation is subsamples that we use in our analysis, the dummies are 
sometimes dropped in the regressions because no individuals in the particular sample belong to one of the 
cohorts included; this is a particularly relevant issue for non white immigrants, who seem to have arrived in the 
UK later than whites. All these concerns make the interpretation and comparison of cohort dummies coefficients 
between different samples quite difficult.  Table 2. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Whites 
                                
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
 High-educated  Low-educated  High-educated  Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated 
exper  0.0027    -0.006  *  -0.0025    -0.0111 **  0.0267    0.0072    0.0109    0.0034    -0.0266    0.0189    
  (0.0065)  (0.0035)   (0.0103)  (0.0051)  (0.0185)  (0.0119)  (0.0313)  (0.0177)  (0.0444)  (0.0220)   
expersq/100                       -0.1006    -0.0436    -0.083    -0.0614    0.0473    -0.12    
                        (0.0723)    (0.0373)    (0.1334)    (0.0608)    (0.2019)    (0.0785)    
YSM  0.0227 ***  0.0388  *** 0.0183 *  0.0317 *** 0.0232 *** 0.039 *** 0.0095   0.0213 **  -0.0804 ** 0.0491   
  (0.0077)  (0.0052)   (0.0102)  (0.0074)  (0.0077)  (0.0052)  (0.0124)  (0.0103)  (0.0382)  (0.0310)   
YSMsq/100                                           0.3298 **  -0.0970    
                                            (0.1348)    (0.1241)    
YSM_x_exper/100        0.031  0.0375      0.1604  0.1414  1.1153 **  -0.226   
       (0.0483)  (0.0279)      (0.1566)  (0.1083)  (0.5657)  (0.3446)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0035    -0.0021    -0.0316    0.0097    
                                  (0.0057)    (0.0031)    (0.0220)    (0.0102)    
YSMsq_x_exper/100              -0.0343 **  0.0117   
              (0.0168)   (0.0118)   
YSMsq_x_expersq/100                                           0.0009 *  -0.0003    
                                            (0.0006)    (0.0003)    
married  0.5358 ***  0.5158 *** 0.5383 *** 0.5128 *** 0.5244 ***  0.51 *** 0.5254 *** 0.4978 *** 0.5219 ***  0.4988 *** 
  (0.0901)  (0.0546)   (0.0902)  (0.0546)  (0.0905)  (0.0548)  (0.0906)  (0.0552)  (0.0909)  (0.0552)   
dkid04  -0.0178    -0.1817  *** -0.0163    -0.1741 *** -0.029    -0.1902 *** -0.0318    -0.1851 *** -0.0285    -0.1843  *** 
   (0.1058)    (0.0585)     (0.1058)    (0.0587)    (0.1064)    (0.0589)    (0.1064)    (0.0590)    (0.1066)    (0.0591)    
dkid59  -0.0259  -0.1161  *  -0.0258  -0.1125 *  -0.0309  -0.1223 **  -0.0368  -0.1245 **  -0.0251   -0.125  ** 
  (0.1145)  (0.0602)   (0.1144)  (0.0603)  (0.1145)  (0.0605)  (0.1147)  (0.0606)  (0.1150)  (0.0607)   
dkid1015  -0.0744    -0.1953  *** -0.0814    -0.2 *** -0.0449    -0.1852 *** -0.0466    -0.1847 *** -0.0345    -0.1929  *** 
   (0.1328)    (0.0640)     (0.1332)    (0.0641)    (0.1345)    (0.0646)    (0.1345)    (0.0647)    (0.1347)    (0.0650)    
d50  -3.7593 *** -4.2949  *** -3.741 *** -4.2413 *** -3.7567 *** -4.3267 *** -3.7210 *** -4.2993 *** -3.7285 *** -4.4238  *** 
  (0.3852)  (0.2434)   (0.3874)  (0.2455)  (0.3883)  (0.2486)  (0.4099)  (0.2607)  (0.4283)  (0.2687)   
d60  -3.8075 ***  -3.9908  *** -3.7473 *** -3.8875 *** -3.8523 ***  -4.0436 *** -3.7646 *** -3.9587 *** -3.7314 ***  -4.1165  *** 
   (0.2995)    (0.1993)     (0.3162)    (0.2100)    (0.3106)    (0.2108)    (0.3299)    (0.2214)    (0.3561)    (0.2330)    
d70  -3.7714 *** -3.7064  *** -3.6977 *** -3.5822 *** -3.8079 *** -3.7547 *** -3.6771 *** -3.6141 *** -3.5689 *** -3.7818  *** 
  (0.2474)  (0.1599)   (0.2761)  (0.1797)  (0.2583)  (0.1723)  (0.2925)  (0.1951)  (0.3294)  (0.2115)   
d80  -3.3976 ***  -3.3087  *** -3.3322 *** -3.1962 *** -3.4267 ***  -3.3571 *** -3.3086 *** -3.2348 *** -3.1475 ***  -3.3982  *** 
   (0.2017)    (0.1285)     (0.2297)    (0.1480)    (0.2134)    (0.1438)    (0.2518)    (0.1697)    (0.3005)    (0.1897)    
d90  -3.1714 *** -2.9746  *** -3.1204 *** -2.8848 *** -3.1987 *** -3.0200 *** -3.1175 *** -2.9392 *** -3.0200 *** -3.0872  *** 
  (0.1781)  (0.1071)   (0.1986)  (0.1212)  (0.1904)  (0.1237)  (0.2228)  (0.1476)  (0.2649)  (0.1653)   
d00  -2.9062 ***  -2.7253  *** -2.8641 *** -2.6459 *** -2.9303 ***  -2.7679 *** -2.8687 *** -2.7058 *** -2.8383 ***  -2.8453  *** 
   (0.1819)    (0.1054)     (0.1964)    (0.1162)    (0.1933)    (0.1210)    (0.2215)    (0.1426)    (0.2571)    (0.1588)    
_cons  4.5653  3.9382    4.57  3.9242  4.4964  3.9109  4.5556  3.9447  4.7817  4.0012   
   (.)    (.)     (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    
N  4557    7386     4557    7386    4557    7386    4557    7386    4557    7386    
LR test on Model C: p-value                        0.3264   0.0673   0.1146   0.1979   
Wald test on Model C: p-value                                   0.3242    0.0656    0.1284    0.1906    
                  
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A1 - Appendix           
         Table 3. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites 
                               
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
 High-educated  Low-educated  High-educated  Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated 
exper  0.0053    -0.0046     0.0117    -0.003    0.0447 ***  0.0133    0.015    -0.0146    0.0282    -0.0251    
  (0.0055)  (0.0033)   (0.0093)  (0.0050)  (0.0165)  (0.0114)  (0.0288)  (0.0188)  (0.0406)  (0.0253)   
expersq/100                       -0.1597 **  -0.0583    -0.0379    0.0278    -0.1273    0.0685    
                        (0.0626)    (0.0354)    (0.1181)    (0.0631)    (0.1701)    (0.0876)    
YSM  0.0299 ***  0.0393 *** 0.0354 *** 0.0415 *** 0.0306 ***  0.0396 *** 0.0209 *  0.0218 **  0.0368   0.0043  
  (0.0068)  (0.0046)   (0.0094)  (0.0070)  (0.0068)  (0.0046)  (0.0121)  (0.0109)  (0.0383)  (0.0345)   
YSMsq/100                                           -0.05    0.0646    
                                            (0.1363)    (0.1389)    
YSM_x_exper/100        -0.0421   -0.0121      0.2036  0.2431 **  0.0444  0.4672   
       (0.0489)  (0.0298)      (0.1676)  (0.1234)  (0.5783)  (0.4142)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0077    -0.0068 *  0.0027    -0.0144    
                                  (0.0061)    (0.0035)    (0.0213)    (0.0123)    
YSMsq_x_exper/100              0.0040   -0.0077   
              (0.0182)   (0.0147)   
YSMsq_x_expersq/100                                           -0.0002    0.0002    
                                            (0.0006)    (0.0004)    
married  0.3579 *** 0.6117  *** 0.3568 *** 0.6130 *** 0.3289 *** 0.6064 *** 0.3293 *** 0.6058 *** 0.3294 *** 0.6044  *** 
  (0.0804)  (0.0537)   (0.0804)  (0.0538)  (0.0814)  (0.0538)  (0.0815)  (0.0541)  (0.0815)  (0.0542)   
dkid04  -0.0638    -0.1714  *** -0.068    -0.1736 *** -0.0832    -0.1818 *** -0.0851    -0.1806 *** -0.0867    -0.1808  *** 
   (0.0781)    (0.0467)     (0.0783)    (0.0470)    (0.0786)    (0.0472)    (0.0787)    (0.0473)    (0.0788)    (0.0473)    
dkid59  0.1687 **  -0.061   0.1651 **  -0.0627  0.1536 *  -0.068  0.1477 *  -0.0742  0.1479 *  -0.0726   
  (0.0837)  (0.0461)   (0.0838)  (0.0463)  (0.0840)  (0.0463)  (0.0842)  (0.0466)  (0.0843)  (0.0466)   
dkid1015  -0.052    -0.0258     -0.0489    -0.0242    -0.0073    -0.0142    -0.0142    -0.0208    -0.0206    -0.0168    
   (0.0960)    (0.0508)     (0.0960)    (0.0509)    (0.0976)    (0.0513)    (0.0979)    (0.0514)    (0.0981)    (0.0517)    
d50    -1.4513  ***         -1.4715  *** 
    (0.2826)           (0.2898)   
d60  -0.8186 ***  -1.0014  ***      0.4404 *       0.4419 *  -0.8212 *** 0.4286 *       -1.0004  *** 
   (0.2224)    (0.1367)          (0.2439)         (0.2428)    (0.2233)    (0.2449)         (0.1376)    
d70  -0.6631 ***  -0.7401 *** 0.1312   0.6932 *** 0.1544   0.6934 *** -0.666 *** 0.6882 *** 0.0843   -0.7317 *** 
  (0.1627)  (0.1075)   (0.1343)  (0.2512)  (0.1316)  (0.2476)  (0.1651)  (0.2525)  (0.1487)  (0.1130)   
d80  -0.6749 ***  -0.4538  *** 0.1198    0.9789 *** 0.1402    0.9819 *** -0.6767 *** 0.9901 *** 0.0730    -0.4307  *** 
   (0.1173)    (0.0802)     (0.1690)    (0.2644)    (0.1666)    (0.2605)    (0.1201)    (0.2655)    (0.1857)    (0.0888)    
d90  -0.3557 ***  -0.2029 *** 0.4478 **  1.2335 *** 0.4591 **  1.2345 *** -0.3563 *** 1.2394 *** 0.4216 **  -0.1902 *** 
  (0.0979)  (0.0637)   (0.1986)  (0.2757)  (0.1977)  (0.2734)  (0.0989)  (0.2765)  (0.2068)  (0.0659)   
d00             0.8149 *** 1.4385 *** 0.8151 ***  1.4394 ***      1.4374 *** 0.8029 ***       
              (0.2228)    (0.2843)    (0.2228)    (0.2826)         (0.2851)    (0.2254)         
_cons  1.278 ***  0.773 *** 0.4066   -0.6857 **  0.3119   -0.7636 **  1.2565 *** -0.5827 *  0.4033   0.9151 *** 
   (0.1779)    (0.1457)     (0.2930)    (0.3204)    (0.2921)    (0.3240)    (0.2189)    (0.3387)    (0.3434)    (0.2111)    
N  4178    7096     4178    7096    4178    7096    4178    7096    4178    7096    
LR test on Model C: p-value                        0.4484   0.1424   0.6182   0.4663   
Wald test on Model C: p-value                                   0.4456    0.1424    0.5999    0.4695    
                               
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A2 - Appendix         
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Table 4. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Whites 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried 
exper  -0.0092 * 0.0000     -0.0111 * -0.0002 0.0064 0.0321 ** -0.0124 0.0467 ** 0.0003    0.0322    
  (0.0047)  (0.0044)   (0.0064)  (0.0068)  (0.0159)  (0.0128)  (0.0232)  (0.0209)  (0.0298)  (0.0268)   
expersq/100                       -0.0495    -0.1183 *** -0.0047    -0.205 **  -0.1    -0.1462    
                        (0.0481)    (0.0442)    (0.0767)    (0.0798)    (0.1012)    (0.1076)    
YSM  0.0483 ***  0.0163 **  0.0454 *** 0.016 *  0.0483 ***  0.0168 **  0.0266 *  0.0122   -0.036   -0.0069  
  (0.0062)  (0.0065)   (0.0091)  (0.0085)  (0.0062)  (0.0065)  (0.0137)  (0.0102)  (0.0434)  (0.0289)   
YSMsq/100                                           0.2811 *  0.0659    
                                            (0.1522)    (0.1073)    
YSM_x_exper/100       0.0148  0.0019      0.2296   -0.0319  0.4731  0.2798   
       (0.0342)  (0.0344)      (0.1407)  (0.1132)  (0.4845)  (0.3746)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0054    0.0031    -0.0011    -0.0078    
                                  (0.0039)    (0.0037)    (0.0138)    (0.0125)    
YSMsq_x_exper/100              -0.0171   -0.0096   
              (0.0152)   (0.0118)   
YSMsq_x_expersq/100                                           0.0002    0.0003    
                                            (0.0004)    (0.0003)    
degree  0.3559 ***  0.3861 *** 0.3609 *** 0.3868 *** 0.3535 ***  0.39 *** 0.366 *** 0.4133 *** 0.369 ***  0.4176 *** 
  (0.0758)  (0.0826)   (0.0768)  (0.0835)  (0.0759)  (0.0827)  (0.0772)  (0.0845)  (0.0771)  (0.0848)   
a_level  0.2276 ***  0.2197  *** 0.2283 *** 0.22 *** 0.2271 ***  0.2138 *** 0.2269 *** 0.2229 *** 0.2402 ***  0.2266  *** 
   (0.0677)    (0.0743)     (0.0677)    (0.0745)    (0.0677)    (0.0744)    (0.0677)    (0.0748)    (0.0681)    (0.0753)    
o_level  -0.0327   0.0033   -0.0308   0.0036  -0.0355  -0.0108  -0.0335  -0.0069  -0.0083  -0.0077   
  (0.0990)  (0.1002)   (0.0991)  (0.1003)  (0.0990)  (0.1004)  (0.0992)  (0.1006)  (0.0995)  (0.1019)   
dkid04  -0.1087 **  -0.4704  *** -0.1064 *  -0.4697 *** -0.1176 **  -0.4879 *** -0.116 **  -0.4692 *** -0.1163 **  -0.4681  *** 
   (0.0541)    (0.1615)     (0.0543)    (0.1620)    (0.0549)    (0.1614)    (0.0549)    (0.1622)    (0.0550)    (0.1623)    
dkid59  -0.0886  -0.1354   -0.0868  -0.1355  -0.0988 *  -0.1371  -0.1049 *  -0.1401  -0.1045 *  -0.1388   
  (0.0556)  (0.1913)   (0.0558)  (0.1913)  (0.0566)  (0.1912)  (0.0567)  (0.1915)  (0.0569)  (0.1916)   
dkid1015  -0.1843 ***  -0.1046     -0.186 *** -0.1047    -0.1806 ***  -0.08    -0.1897 *** -0.0758    -0.1896 ***  -0.0619    
   (0.0660)    (0.1477)     (0.0661)    (0.1477)    (0.0662)    (0.1482)    (0.0665)    (0.1483)    (0.0667)    (0.1493)    
d50  -4.0841 *** -4.5059  *** -4.064 *** -4.3283 *** -4.1161 *** -4.4272 *** -4.1794 *** -4.3191 *** -4.2953 *** -4.2488  *** 
  (0.2839)  (0.2758)   (0.2868)  (0.3113)  (0.2938)  (0.3137)  (0.3152)  (0.3243)  (0.3378)  (0.3317)   
d60  -3.7517 ***  -4.3745  *** -3.7153 *** -4.1936 *** -3.8005 ***  -4.3749 *** -3.8501 *** -4.1652 *** -4.0246 ***  -4.072  *** 
   (0.2358)    (0.2060)     (0.2481)    (0.2566)    (0.2531)    (0.2563)    (0.2733)    (0.2641)    (0.3019)    (0.2726)    
d70  -3.4504 *** -4.2217  *** -3.4089 *** -4.0398 *** -3.4976 *** -4.2082 *** -3.5164 *** -3.9732 *** -3.6446 *** -3.8748  *** 
  (0.1933)  (0.1590)   (0.2130)  (0.2200)  (0.2131)  (0.2101)  (0.2439)  (0.2299)  (0.2791)  (0.2454)   
d80  -2.9241 ***  -3.9348  *** -2.8867 *** -3.7534 *** -2.9754 ***  -3.9122 *** -3.0054 *** -3.6963 *** -3.0542 ***  -3.5924  *** 
   (0.1554)    (0.1200)     (0.1748)    (0.1848)    (0.1817)    (0.1767)    (0.2151)    (0.1996)    (0.2544)    (0.2210)    
d90  -2.6055 *** -3.6346  *** -2.5737 *** -3.4546 *** -2.6538 *** -3.6123 *** -2.6988 *** -3.4346 *** -2.7516 *** -3.3399  *** 
  (0.1303)  (0.0928)   (0.1466)  (0.1507)  (0.1588)  (0.1512)  (0.1940)  (0.1687)  (0.2322)  (0.1850)   
d00  -2.3585 ***  -3.3323     -2.3309 *** -3.1525 *** -2.4016 ***  -3.3056 *** -2.4612 *** -3.1333 *** -2.5367 ***  -3.0451  *** 
   (0.1263)    (.)     (0.1387)    (0.1470)    (0.1527)    (0.1487)    (0.1859)    (0.1650)    (0.2223)    (0.1784)    
_cons  3.9966  4.7841  *** 3.9936  4.6069  3.9503  4.6131   4.166  4.4222  4.3109  4.3915   
   (.)    (0.1388)     (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)    
N  7900 4043     7900 4043 7900 4043 7900 4043 7900    4043    
LR test on Model C: p-value       0.2174 0.2354 0.0486   3.7600   
Wald test on Model C: p-value                                   0.2100    0.2328    0.0493    0.5847    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A3 - Appendix     Table 5. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried 
exper  -0.0028 0.0006     -0.0003 0.0055 0.026 **  0.0393 *** 0.0001 0.0259 -0.0151    0.0204    
  (0.0038)  (0.0045)   (0.0057)  (0.0073)  (0.0131)  (0.0140)  (0.0214)  (0.0239)  (0.0293)  (0.0332)   
expersq/100                       -0.0904 **  -0.1483 *** -0.0146    -0.1056    0.0297    -0.0736    
                        (0.0393)    (0.0506)    (0.0703)    (0.0919)    (0.0987)    (0.1311)    
YSM  0.0408 ***  0.0228 *** 0.0443 *** 0.0277 *** 0.0412 ***  0.024 *** 0.0219 *  0.0178   0.0137   -0.0234  
  (0.0048)  (0.0069)   (0.0076)  (0.0088)  (0.0048)  (0.0069)  (0.0125)  (0.0110)  (0.0393)  (0.0345)   
YSMsq/100                                           0.0198    0.164    
                                            (0.1431)    (0.1292)    
YSM_x_exper/100        -0.0191   -0.0349      0.2384 *  0.1079  0.5464  0.2852   
       (0.0327)  (0.0398)      (0.1390)  (0.1436)  (0.4699)  (0.5135)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0064    -0.0033    -0.0158    -0.0086    
                                  (0.0039)    (0.0048)    (0.0137)    (0.0180)    
YSMsq_x_exper/100              -0.0089   -0.0084   
              (0.0156)   (0.0168)   
YSMsq_x_expersq/100                                           0.0003    0.0002    
                                            (0.0004)    (0.0005)    
degree  0.4492 *** 0.5151  *** 0.4436 *** 0.5095 *** 0.4434 *** 0.5362 *** 0.4499 *** 0.5359 *** 0.4567 *** 0.5356  *** 
  (0.0601)  (0.0849)   (0.0608)  (0.0850)  (0.0602)  (0.0855)  (0.0612)  (0.0865)  (0.0615)  (0.0864)   
a_level  0.1934 ***  0.11     0.1903 *** 0.1097    0.187 ***  0.1131    0.1878 *** 0.1096    0.1917 ***  0.1238    
   (0.0547)    (0.0772)     (0.0550)    (0.0771)    (0.0548)    (0.0772)    (0.0550)    (0.0774)    (0.0553)    (0.0780)    
o_level  0.1129  -0.1088    0.11  -0.1072   0.1055  -0.1116   0.1052  -0.1148   0.1102  -0.0915   
  (0.0814)  (0.0997)   (0.0815)  (0.0997)  (0.0815)  (0.0997)  (0.0817)  (0.0998)  (0.0819)  (0.1008)   
dkid04  -0.1546 ***  0.3124     -0.1577 *** 0.3111    -0.1689 ***  0.2917    -0.1661 *** 0.2855    -0.1687 ***  0.2921    
   (0.0413)    (0.2031)     (0.0416)    (0.2032)    (0.0418)    (0.2031)    (0.0419)    (0.2032)    (0.0419)    (0.2034)    
dkid59  -0.0144  -0.0195   -0.0174  -0.0202   -0.031   -0.011  -0.0343  -0.0137  -0.0378  -0.0038   
  (0.0416)  (0.1677)   (0.0419)  (0.1679)  (0.0423)  (0.1680)  (0.0424)  (0.1681)  (0.0425)  (0.1684)   
dkid1015  -0.0334    -0.1022     -0.0316    -0.1011    -0.0305    -0.068    -0.0395    -0.068    -0.0429    -0.062    
   (0.0506)    (0.1234)     (0.0507)    (0.1234)    (0.0507)    (0.1237)    (0.0511)    (0.1238)    (0.0512)    (0.1241)    
d50    -0.8896  **  -1.5432 *** -0.8344 * -1.5441 ***  -0.8238 * -1.5392 *** -0.8341 * -1.4906 ***     
   (0.4343)   (0.3181)  (0.4387)  (0.3179)  (0.4345)  (0.3219)  (0.4388)  (0.3241)      
d60  0.4531    -0.8564  *** -1.1036 *** -0.8397 *** -1.0997 ***  -0.8399 *** -1.1023 *** -0.8515 *** -1.1056 ***  0.0891    
   (0.2784)    (0.2069)     (0.1415)    (0.2079)    (0.1414)    (0.2076)    (0.1415)    (0.2086)    (0.1420)    (0.3941)    
d70  0.705 **  -0.5692 *** -0.8624 *** -0.5885 *** -0.8618 ***  -0.5814 *** -0.8576 *** -0.5773 *** -0.9 ***  0.4449  
  (0.2826)  (0.1577)   (0.1101)  (0.1593)  (0.1094)  (0.1580)  (0.1102)  (0.1596)  (0.1157)  (0.4161)   
d80  0.9472 ***  -0.4353  *** -0.6201 *** -0.453 *** -0.6209 ***  -0.4421 *** -0.6112 *** -0.4359 *** -0.6599 ***  0.6256    
   (0.2961)    (0.1143)     (0.0830)    (0.1160)    (0.0821)    (0.1145)    (0.0830)    (0.1164)    (0.0904)    (0.4313)    
d90  1.2352 ***  -0.1758  ** -0.3277 *** -0.1851 ** -0.3279 *** -0.184 ** -0.3226 *** -0.1799 ** -0.3433 *** 0.8338  * 
  (0.3075)  (0.0870)   (0.0675)  (0.0876)  (0.0673)  (0.0871)  (0.0675)  (0.0877)  (0.0693)  (0.4416)   
d00  1.5599 ***                                           0.9627  ** 
   (0.3164)                                             (0.4487)    
_cons  -0.1869   0.8718 *** 1.3445 *** 0.8222 *** 1.2071 ***  0.6872 *** 1.3849 *** 0.7561 *** 1.4585 ***  -0.1237  
   (0.3435)    (0.2068)     (0.1488)    (0.2143)    (0.1575)    (0.2158)    (0.1906)    (0.2346)    (0.2315)    (0.5226)    
N  8448 2847     8448 2847 8448 2847 8448 2847 8448    2847    
LR test on Model C: p-value       0.2297 0.7492 0.3948   0.3928   
Wald test on Model C: p-value                                   0.2278    0.7493    0.3909    0.4035    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A4 - Appendix         
   20
Tables 4-5 show evidence of a higher employment rate for individuals the higher the 
education qualification they have. Quite intuitively, having a qualification at degree level 
seems to give the greatest and most robust employment advantage, since the effect is always 
strongly significant. A qualification below degree level (or at A-level or equivalent) gives a 
premium as well if compared to lower qualifications, but the effect appears to be less robust, 
in particular for nonwhite immigrants
17.  
 
No clear and consistent regional pattern emerges from the regressions (estimates of these 
parameters can be found in the Appendix, Tables A1-A4). There seems to be an employment 
disadvantage in the North West and West Midlands for low-educated immigrants, both white 
and nonwhite. An advantage for low-educated white immigrants appears in the South East 
and East of England. Unmarried whites show a disadvantage in Yorkshire and the Humber, 
while married whites seems to have an advantage in the East of England. When disaggregated 
by marital status, nonwhite immigrants appear to have lower employment rates in the West 
Midlands, while the rate seems to be higher for unmarried individuals in the South East and 
for married individuals in the South West. 
 
To give an idea of the employment assimilation profiles, we compute marginal effects of the 
regressions for an individual with the characteristics of the average immigrant, i.e. 15 years of 
experience, married, with at least one child aged 4 or below, living in the London area 
(interviewed in quarter 2). We compute the employment probability of an immigrant with 
YSM=5, 10 and 15, arrived in the 1970s and in the 1990s, and compare it to the employment 
probability of a native with the same characteristics and coming from the same ethnic group. 
We use equation (C) for this purpose, as both LR and Wald tests reported in Tables 2-5 show 
that any additional combination of the variables exper and YSM is not relevant for the model . 
We can see that for both whites and nonwhites, and high- and low-educated immigrants, the 
% employment probability differential is much lower the longer the residence in the 
destination country. The performance gap is higher for nonwhites than for whites, and the 
disadvantage experienced by low-educated individuals is higher than that of the higher 
educated. In every case, however, the gap that we observe decreases as YSM increase, as the 
assimilation theory would predict. There seems to be a performance differential also among 
different cohorts. We report here the estimated probabilities for individuals with the same 
                                                 
17 For nonwhite immigrants, the effect seems to be limited to the group of married individuals, while it is not 
significant for the unmarried ones.   21
characteristics, but arrived at different points in time, and we see that the performance of the 
more recent cohort is better, with low-educated immigrants who even seem to perform better 
than natives after 10 and 15 years of residence in the country. 
 
Table 6. Predicted employment probability differences wrt natives,  
using model C from Tables 2-3 
      
   Whites  Nonwhites 
 YSM  5  10  15  5  10  15 
   Arrival cohort                   
1970s -8.0393 -6.2936 -4.8192 -13.2413 -10.0044  -7.3094 High-
educated  1990s -1.5874 -0.9678 -0.4802 -7.30947 -5.1286  -3.3841
1970s -17.9441 -12.2446 -7.4480 -22.0294 -15.2483  -9.2859 Low-
educated  1990s -1.1717 1.2719 3.0546 -5.5115 -1.1606  2.2771
 
 
5.2 Earnings  
 
We use the Heckman procedure for earnings, thereby estimating a model of the probability of 
being in paid employment using a probit for emp, and then a linear regression model for 
wage, in which we include  ) ( γ λ i z′  to control for truncation. Of course an identification 
problem arises here for the hazard rate, so that we have to include in the employment equation 
at least one exogenous variable that does not enter the structural relationship. We therefore 
include variables which are supposed to capture a particular motivation to obtain a paid job, 
but which should not be relevant for the level of wage earned by the individual; we identify 
these characteristics in variables about particular family circumstances, i.e. marital status and 
the dummies relative to the presence of children. 
 
Using the Heckman Selectivity Model also makes it relatively easy to test for the existence of 
sample selection, with a simple t-test on the estimated parameter of lambda (the hazard rate). 
What we observe in our results is that the coefficient of the lambda is always significant in the 
regressions we run on samples disaggregated by educational level, but less so in those for 
samples disaggregated by marital status
18. This implies that sample selection is a problem 
more when we use groups of individuals divided by educational level. Whenever significant, 
the coefficients of the lambda are negative; as Chiswick et al. (2005) point out, this ‘indicates 
                                                 
18 In this second case, the parameters are significant only for married nonwhites individuals.   22
that there is a negative correlation between the error terms in the selection equation 
determining whether the immigrant is in paid employment and the earnings equation. That is, 
immigrants with an above average probability of being in paid employment, given their 
observed characteristics, have a lower than average expected earnings, again given their 
observed characteristics. In other words, there is negative selection into paid employment’, 
which seems to point in the direction of a situation where immigrants move to other labour 
markets because they need to work, more than for a comparative advantage in the type of jobs 
offered in the labour market of the destination country, which would assure higher  earnings. 
Results are presented in Tables 7-10. The estimates of the Probit regressions for the first 
stage, produced in the Appendix (Tables A9-A12), show that the over-identifying restrictions 
used (marital status and dummies for the presence of children) are statistically significant, 
which allows us to rightfully rely on the Heckman procedure for the analysis. 
The estimates again show a clear and consistent pattern as far as YSM is concerned, with 
positive and significant coefficients with any specification of the model (although again the 
estimate loses significance when too much structure is added to the model as for the two main 
variables exper and YSM). So once again, the hypothesis of a positive economic assimilation 
seems to be confirmed by evidence. 
Using Heckman allows us to directly read and interpret the coefficients of the variables – 
something we obviously could not do with estimates from Probit regressions – and this can be 
particularly useful if we want to say something about the unobserved quality of successive 
arrival cohorts. However, the same issues we needed to consider for these variables in 
analysing the employment regressions are valid even here, in particular the consideration 
about the lack of individuals in some of the early cohorts and the cohort of reference, which 
can be the first or the last one depending on which one is dropped in the regression. However, 
the picture that emerges shows that the unobserved quality of cohorts seems to increase over 
time, as the performance of each cohort is better than that of the previous one and worse than 
that of the following one
19. The result is highly significant and robust to different model 
specifications. Only for highly-educated whites no clear pattern is indentified. 
Our estimates of the earnings equations also provide evidence of positive but decreasing 
returns to (potential) working experience of the individual, although this result is more robust 
to different specifications for whites than for nonwhites. 
                                                 
19 One needs to note that this conclusion is drawn from coefficients that might be different in sign: when the 
reference cohort is the first one available (either before 1950, or 1950-1959), the coefficients are positive and 
increasing with subsequent arrival cohorts; when the reference cohort is the last one (2000-2009), the sign is 
negative with decreasing coefficients.  Table 7. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Whites 
                               
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
   High-educated  Low-educated  High-educated  Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated 
exper  0.0216 ***  0.0128 *** 0.0352 *** 0.0147 *** 0.0745 ***  0.0395 *** 0.0855 *** 0.0393 *** 0.1073 ***  0.045 *** 
  (0.0057)  (0.0020)   (0.0086)  (0.0030)  (0.0143)  (0.0062)  (0.0227)  (0.0090)  (0.0311)  (0.0115)   
expersq/100                       -0.2079 ***  -0.0901 *** -0.2403 **  -0.1055 *** -0.3043 **  -0.1168  *** 
                        (0.0537)    (0.0202)    (0.0954)    (0.0322)    (0.1384)    (0.0432)    
YSM  0.0127   0.0101  *** 0.0252 ** 0.0129 *** 0.0162 ** 0.0123 *** 0.0222 ** 0.0043   0.0511 *  0.0059   
  (0.0083)  (0.0038)   (0.0099)  (0.0048)  (0.0065)  (0.0036)  (0.0093)  (0.0053)  (0.0292)  (0.0156)   
YSM2/100                                           -0.1026    -0.0011    
                                            (0.1041)    (0.0619)    
YSM_x_exper/100       -0.0786 **  -0.0143       -0.0832   0.0649   -0.5878   -0.0837  
       (0.0395)  (0.0157)      (0.1119)  (0.0546)  (0.4195)  (0.1755)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 0.0024    -0.0009    0.0172    0.0032    
                                  (0.0039)    (0.0015)    (0.0156)    (0.0053)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              0.0157   0.0038   
              (0.0120)   (0.0059)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           -0.0005    -0.0001    
                                            (0.0004)    (0.0001)    
pt  -0.3868 **  -0.553  *** -0.3714 **  -0.5524 *** -0.3541 *** -0.5404 *** -0.3535 *** -0.5359 *** -0.3577 *** -0.5417  *** 
  (0.1663)  (0.0472)   (0.1580)  (0.0474)  (0.1280)  (0.0428)  (0.1263)  (0.0409)  (0.1292)  (0.0413)   
d50  0.3858    -0.5683  *** 0.3165         0.3135         0.3118         0.3469         
   (1.0164)    (0.1574)     (0.9637)         (0.7826)         (0.7710)         (0.7908)         
d60  0.6341   -0.4658  *** 0.4755  0.0837  0.4765  0.0625  0.4705  0.0861  0.5318  0.1006   
  (1.0113)  (0.1254)   (0.9615)  (0.0714)  (0.7796)  (0.0616)  (0.7700)  (0.0622)  (0.7940)  (0.0648)   
d70  0.8129    -0.3706  *** 0.6083    0.1693 *  0.6599    0.169 **  0.6375    0.2223 *** 0.7188    0.2626  *** 
   (1.0175)    (0.0981)     (0.9697)    (0.0915)    (0.7843)    (0.0765)    (0.7760)    (0.0804)    (0.8031)    (0.0862)    
d80  0.9051   -0.2493  *** 0.7327  0.2951 **  0.8089  0.3128 *** 0.7885  0.3641 *** 0.8456  0.4053  *** 
  (1.0315)  (0.0655)   (0.9816)  (0.1189)  (0.7942)  (0.1036)  (0.7854)  (0.1048)  (0.8130)  (0.1106)   
d90  1.1353    -0.0246     1.0135    0.5306 *** 1.0697    0.5597 *** 1.0615    0.5916 *** 1.1035    0.6005  *** 
   (1.0461)    (0.0412)     (0.9936)    (0.1473)    (0.8052)    (0.1321)    (0.7948)    (0.1287)    (0.8190)    (0.1312)    
d00  1.1301      1.0372  0.5606 *** 1.0964  0.6011 *** 1.0947  0.6279 *** 1.1261  0.6214  *** 
  (1.0577)      (1.0038)  (0.1586)  (0.8139)  (0.1434)  (0.8029)  (0.1384)  (0.8249)  (0.1400)   
_cons  1.2041    2.093  *** 1.1543    1.5078 *** 0.9679    1.3207 *** 0.9037    1.3203 *** 0.7623    1.3028  *** 
   (1.0769)    (0.0701)     (1.0205)    (0.1932)    (0.8318)    (0.1846)    (0.8227)    (0.1784)    (0.8426)    (0.1833)    
lambda  -1.737 ***  -0.7951 *** -1.6461 *** -0.7982 *** -1.337 ***  -0.721 *** -1.3165 *** -0.6797 *** -1.3456 ***  -0.6942 *** 
   (0.5619)    (0.1454)     (0.5314)    (0.1458)    (0.4508)    (0.1347)    (0.4433)    (0.1311)    (0.4465)    (0.1321)    
N  2962    4428     2962    4428    2962    4428    2962    4428    2962    4428    
F-test on Model C: p-value                                 0.7319    0.1148    0.764    0.1986    
                               
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A5 - Appendix           
 
 Table 8. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Nonwhites 
                                
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
   High-educated  Low-educated  High-educated  Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated High-educated Low-educated 
                      
exper  0    -0.0001     0.0026    -0.0019    0.0317 ***  0.0157 **  0.036 *** 0.0121    0.0472 **  0.0203    
  (0.0031)  (0.0017)   (0.0052)  (0.0026)  (0.0095)  (0.0064)  (0.0133)  (0.0100)  (0.0185)  (0.0133)   
expersq/100                       -0.1161 ***  -0.0494 **  -0.1435 *** -0.0579 *  -0.1514 **  -0.0787  * 
                        (0.0329)    (0.0192)    (0.0515)    (0.0329)    (0.0751)    (0.0450)    
YSM 0.03 ***  0.0263***  *** 0.0326 *** 0.0237 *** 0.0325 ***  0.0269 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0133 **  0.0572 ***  -0.0076   
  (0.0048)  (0.0030)   (0.0062)  (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0030)  (0.0060)  (0.0064)  (0.0187)  (0.0187)   
YSM2/100                                           -0.1029    0.1026    
                                            (0.0653)    (0.0731)    
YSM_x_exper/100       -0.0166   0.0141      -0.0101   0.1162 *  -0.3864   0.0223   
       (0.0255)  (0.0152)      (0.0763)  (0.0702)  (0.2707)  (0.2215)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 0.0010    -0.0019    0.0087    0.0022    
                                  (0.0026)    (0.0019)    (0.0096)    (0.0064)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              0.0137   -0.0008   
              (0.0084)   (0.0076)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           -0.0003    -0.0001    
                                            (0.0003)    (0.0002)    
pt -0.5329 ***  -0.3411  *** -0.5303 *** -0.3410 *** -0.5252 ***  -0.3375 *** -0.5268 *** -0.3358 *** -0.5235 ***  -0.3345  *** 
  (0.0533)  (0.0292)   (0.0513)  (0.0292)  (0.0434)  (0.0292)  (0.0434)  (0.0292)  (0.0432)  (0.0291)   
d50  -0.932 ***  -1.0014  *** -0.919 *** -1.0155 ***      -1.0042 ***           -1.0549 ***  -1.1147  *** 
   (0.2531)    (0.1825)     (0.2437)    (0.1832)         (0.1817)              (0.2070)    (0.1841)    
d60  -0.8611 ***  -0.847  *** -0.8664 *** -0.8488 *** 0.0348  -0.8561 *** 0.0535   0.1845  -0.8986 ***  -0.8564  *** 
  (0.1518)  (0.0889)   (0.1465)  (0.0890)  (0.1623)  (0.0888)  (0.1635)  (0.1484)  (0.1289)  (0.0896)   
d70  -0.6331 ***  -0.699  *** -0.6477 *** -0.6922 *** 0.2668    -0.716 *** 0.2964 *  0.3502 **  -0.622 ***  -0.6352  *** 
   (0.1161)    (0.0704)     (0.1150)    (0.0707)    (0.1640)    (0.0708)    (0.1672)    (0.1538)    (0.1089)    (0.0730)    
d80 -0.333 ***  -0.5255  *** -0.3489 *** -0.5172 *** 0.5677 ***  -0.5418 *** 0.5977 *** 0.5358 *** -0.3355 ***  -0.4271  *** 
  (0.0974)  (0.0488)   (0.0979)  (0.0496)  (0.1737)  (0.0494)  (0.1769)  (0.1647)  (0.0967)  (0.0526)   
d90  -0.1355 **  -0.2667  *** -0.1437 **  -0.263 *** 0.7908 ***  -0.2745 *** 0.8163 *** 0.7944 *** -0.1468 **  -0.2236  *** 
   (0.0625)    (0.0342)     (0.0620)    (0.0344)    (0.1847)    (0.0343)    (0.1866)    (0.1749)    (0.0590)    (0.0350)    
d00           0.965 ***    0.9866 *** 1.0604 ***      
          (0.1990)    (0.1998)   (0.1821)       
_cons  2.5228 ***  1.9393  *** 2.4877 *** 1.9643 *** 1.3516 ***  1.8346 *** 1.3265 *** 0.8334 *** 2.2393 ***  1.9103  *** 
   (0.1154)    (0.0902)     (0.1244)    (0.0940)    (0.2500)    (0.1013)    (0.2490)    (0.2261)    (0.1378)    (0.1187)    
lambda  -0.794 ***  -0.1917  ** -0.7641 *** -0.191 ** -0.5574 ** -0.1733 ** -0.5534 ** -0.1477 *  -0.639 ***  -0.1625  * 
   (0.2653)    (0.0871)     (0.2597)    (0.0871)    (0.2362)    (0.0883)    (0.2368)    (0.0886)    (0.2450)    (0.0893)    
N  2461    3883     2461    3883    2461    3883    2461    3883    2461    3883    
F-test on Model C: p-value                                 0.6492    0.0143    0.2595    0.0000    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A6 - Appendix           
 
 Table 9. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Whites 
                  
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
  Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried 
exper  0.0073 ***  0.017  *** 0.0124 *** 0.0162 *** 0.0583 *** 0.0498 *** 0.0646 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0605 *** 0.0737  *** 
  (0.0020)  (0.0021)   (0.0027)  (0.0033)  (0.0053)  (0.0066)  (0.0084)  (0.0110)  (0.0110)  (0.0122)   
expersq/100                       -0.1681 ***  -0.1309 *** -0.2103 *** -0.1949 *** -0.1904 ***  -0.2906  *** 
                        (0.0168)    (0.0262)    (0.0292)    (0.0504)    (0.0402)    (0.0548)    
YSM  0.0278 ***  0.019 *** 0.033 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0287 ***  0.0218 *** 0.0242 *** 0.0129 *** -0.0033   0.0184  
  (0.0038)  (0.0041)   (0.0042)  (0.0045)  (0.0037)  (0.0040)  (0.0047)  (0.0046)  (0.0137)  (0.0123)   
YSM2/100                                           0.0935 **  -0.0025    
                                            (0.0471)    (0.0478)    
YSM_x_exper/100       -0.0312 *** 0.0052       0.017   0.0466   0.1733   -0.2488  
       (0.0111)  (0.0155)      (0.0456)  (0.0479)  (0.1650)  (0.1658)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 0.0007    0.0008    -0.0036    0.0157  *** 
                                  (0.0013)    (0.0017)    (0.0050)    (0.0058)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              -0.0061   0.0059   
              (0.0048)   (0.0052)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           0.0001    -0.0003  ** 
                                            (0.0001)    (0.0002)    
degree  0.4903 *** 0.3492  *** 0.4734 *** 0.351 *** 0.475 *** 0.3732 *** 0.4956 *** 0.3959 *** 0.4897 *** 0.3768  *** 
  (0.0331)  (0.0591)   (0.0335)  (0.0606)  (0.0324)  (0.0564)  (0.0331)  (0.0609)  (0.0330)  (0.0632)   
a_level  0.0557 *  0.0448     0.0479    0.0456    0.0507 *  0.0461    0.0614 **  0.0511    0.0643 **  0.0437    
   (0.0301)    (0.0423)     (0.0301)    (0.0427)    (0.0296)    (0.0402)    (0.0298)    (0.0410)    (0.0301)    (0.0429)    
o_level  -0.0729 ** -0.1153  ** -0.0752 ** -0.1152 ** -0.0773 ** -0.1346 *** -0.0746 ** -0.1383 *** -0.0679 *  -0.123  ** 
  (0.0361)  (0.0496)   (0.0359)  (0.0496)  (0.0356)  (0.0480)  (0.0359)  (0.0477)  (0.0362)  (0.0488)   
pt  -0.5501 ***  -0.4454  *** -0.5488 *** -0.4464 *** -0.5365 ***  -0.4327 *** -0.5357 *** -0.4358 *** -0.5422 ***  -0.4352  *** 
   (0.0480)    (0.0475)     (0.0480)    (0.0476)    (0.0475)    (0.0470)    (0.0473)    (0.0468)    (0.0474)    (0.0468)    
d50  0.4116       0.406    0.4461    0.4552    0.4998      
  (0.3408)       (0.3383)    (0.3360)    (0.3402)    (0.3377)      
d60  0.6167 *  0.289  *** 0.5748 *  0.2979 *** 0.5867 *  0.1975 **  0.6324 *  0.2891 *** 0.7023 **  0.2169  ** 
   (0.3397)    (0.0806)     (0.3375)    (0.0866)    (0.3349)    (0.0772)    (0.3395)    (0.0855)    (0.3377)    (0.0945)    
d70  0.8173 **  0.4771  *** 0.7545 **  0.4896 *** 0.7877 ** 0.413 *** 0.8589 ** 0.553 *** 0.961 ***  0.4731  *** 
  (0.3419)  (0.1001)   (0.3402)  (0.1111)  (0.3371)  (0.0918)  (0.3424)  (0.1118)  (0.3413)  (0.1306)   
d80  1.1587 ***  0.6066  *** 1.0999 *** 0.6178 *** 1.1373 ***  0.5765 *** 1.2077 *** 0.7039 *** 1.3143 ***  0.6274  *** 
   (0.3493)    (0.1335)     (0.3474)    (0.1430)    (0.3442)    (0.1223)    (0.3495)    (0.1434)    (0.3480)    (0.1655)    
d90  1.538 *** 0.9057  *** 1.4919 *** 0.9135 *** 1.5297 *** 0.9076 *** 1.5895 *** 0.9891 *** 1.6496 *** 0.9098  *** 
  (0.3572)  (0.1814)   (0.3551)  (0.1878)  (0.3519)  (0.1659)  (0.3568)  (0.1813)  (0.3536)  (0.1978)   
d00  1.6616 ***  1.0611  *** 1.6222 *** 1.0679 *** 1.6749 ***  1.0838 *** 1.7326 *** 1.1547 *** 1.76 ***  1.0675  *** 
   (0.3627)    (0.2052)     (0.3605)    (0.2110)    (0.3574)    (0.1887)    (0.3619)    (0.2032)    (0.3576)    (0.2160)    
_cons  0.3466  0.8491  *** 0.336  0.8489 *** 0.0458  0.6502 **  -0.0261  0.6022 **  0.0119  0.6725  ** 
  (0.3782)  (0.2750)   (0.3756)  (0.2777)  (0.3754)  (0.2688)  (0.3780)  (0.2911)  (0.3739)  (0.2979)   
lambda  0.1941   -0.328    0.1325  -0.3259   0.1675  -0.1758   0.2636  -0.1648   0.2002  -0.2585   
   (0.2408)    (0.3067)     (0.2412)    (0.3105)    (0.2340)    (0.2915)    (0.2315)    (0.2996)    (0.2272)    (0.3080)    
N  4869  2521   4869  2521  4869  2521  4869  2521  4869  2521   
F-test on Model C: p-value                                 0.0127    0.0041    0.0008    0.0002    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A7 - Appendix           Table 10. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Nonwhites 
                  
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
    Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried Married Unmarried 
exper  -0.0005  0.0085  *** 0.0008  0.0047  0.0217 **  0.0394 *** 0.0365 *** 0.0229 *  0.0628 ***  0.0151   
  (0.0020)  (0.0026)   (0.0032)  (0.0040)  (0.0086)  (0.0111)  (0.0112)  (0.0137)  (0.0187)  (0.0170)   
expersq/100                       -0.0698 ***  -0.1158 *** -0.1292 *** -0.0985 *  -0.1976 ***  -0.0684    
                        (0.0265)    (0.0394)    (0.0373)    (0.0544)    (0.0628)    (0.0682)    
YSM  0.0205 ***  0.0273 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0238 *** 0.019 ***  0.0316 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0153 **  0.0522 **  -0.0146  
  (0.0053)  (0.0070)   (0.0062)  (0.0074)  (0.0059)  (0.0073)  (0.0068)  (0.0070)  (0.0242)  (0.0189)   
YSM2/100                                           -0.0986    0.1103    
                                            (0.0850)    (0.0757)    
YSM_x_exper/100       -0.0088   0.0256       -0.0688   0.1897 **  -0.6652 **  0.335  
       (0.0175)  (0.0211)      (0.0722)  (0.0849)  (0.3051)  (0.2702)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 0.0028    -0.0038    0.0193 **  -0.0072    
                                  (0.0020)    (0.0027)    (0.0090)    (0.0092)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              0.0181 *  -0.0076   
              (0.0095)   (0.0086)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           -0.0005 *  0.0002    
                                            (0.0003)    (0.0003)    
degree  0.4869 ***  0.5328 *** 0.4796 *** 0.5376 *** 0.4575 ***  0.624 *** 0.4951 *** 0.6267 *** 0.4643 ***  0.5474 *** 
  (0.0679)  (0.1413)   (0.0703)  (0.1415)  (0.0741)  (0.1461)  (0.0611)  (0.1466)  (0.0742)  (0.1364)   
a_level  0.0738    0.1344  **  0.0697    0.1349 **  0.0537    0.1683 **  0.0768 *  0.162 **  0.0598    0.1456  ** 
   (0.0496)    (0.0642)     (0.0512)    (0.0642)    (0.0548)    (0.0660)    (0.0447)    (0.0653)    (0.0541)    (0.0654)    
o_level  -0.0496  -0.1009   -0.0523  -0.1051 *  -0.0657  -0.1051  -0.0508  -0.1216 *  -0.0638  -0.0974   
  (0.0537)  (0.0632)   (0.0554)  (0.0633)  (0.0606)  (0.0640)  (0.0494)  (0.0644)  (0.0596)  (0.0621)   
pt  -0.4144 ***  -0.3393  *** -0.4154 *** -0.3448 *** -0.4127 ***  -0.3271 *** -0.4102 *** -0.34 *** -0.4105 ***  -0.3441  *** 
   (0.0307)    (0.0429)     (0.0317)    (0.0431)    (0.0354)    (0.0427)    (0.0289)    (0.0427)    (0.0346)    (0.0427)    
d50         -1.3134 ***  -1.4158 *** -0.697 *** -1.4959 ***  -1.3845  *** 
         (0.3490)    (0.3475)  (0.2308)  (0.3584)    (0.3558)   
d60  -0.0954    0.3932  *  -0.1054    -0.8993 *** -0.1143    -1.0198 *** -0.7658 *** -1.0464 *** 0.0001    -0.9139  *** 
   (0.1526)    (0.2039)     (0.1581)    (0.2579)    (0.1748)    (0.2578)    (0.1494)    (0.2626)    (0.1764)    (0.2458)    
d70  0.0583   0.5446  **  0.0417  -0.7219 *** 0.0188  -0.8512 *** -0.6092 *** -0.8019 *** 0.1982  -0.6779  *** 
  (0.1633)  (0.2225)   (0.1705)  (0.1905)  (0.1856)  (0.1966)  (0.1216)  (0.1908)  (0.1913)  (0.1695)   
d80  0.2155    0.7406  *** 0.1961    -0.5245 *** 0.1594    -0.6362 *** -0.4545 *** -0.5809 *** 0.341    -0.4456  *** 
   (0.1870)    (0.2435)     (0.1948)    (0.1537)    (0.2106)    (0.1578)    (0.0879)    (0.1512)    (0.2144)    (0.1262)    
d90  0.4307 **  0.946 *** 0.4103 *  -0.3269 *** 0.3632   -0.379 *** -0.2332 *** -0.3513 *** 0.501 **  -0.2841 *** 
  (0.2181)  (0.2974)   (0.2262)  (0.0777)  (0.2437)  (0.0807)  (0.0516)  (0.0773)  (0.2434)  (0.0662)   
d00  0.6504 **  1.2807  *** 0.6292 **       0.5757 **                 0.6828 **       
   (0.2534)    (0.3464)     (0.2620)         (0.2815)                   (0.2787)         
_cons  1.6102 ***  0.5313   1.6236 *** 1.844 *** 1.5933 ***  1.52 *** 2.0452 *** 1.651 *** 1.2609 ***  1.8668 *** 
   (0.3480)    (0.5641)     (0.3582)    (0.2658)    (0.3976)    (0.3051)    (0.1347)    (0.2862)    (0.3787)    (0.2507)    
lambda  -0.7156 **  -0.0319   -0.7375 **  -0.0263  -0.8251 ***  0.2202  -0.6716 *** 0.2087  -0.8037 **  -0.0427   
   (0.2930)    (0.4250)     (0.3017)    (0.4249)    (0.3191)    (0.4313)    (0.2595)    (0.4299)    (0.3141)    (0.3990)    
N  4646  1698   4646  1698  4646  1698  4646  1698  4646  1698   
F-test on Model C: p-value                                 0.1569    0.0075    0.0225    0.1005    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A8 - Appendix           
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Tables 9-10 show that holding a higher educational qualification, especially at degree level, 
yields strong and consistent wage premiums (the coefficients on degree range from 0.35 to 
0.63, according to the specification used), which appear to be higher for nonwhites. Higher 
qualifications below degree level, or A-level or equivalent, seem to provide an earning 
advantage as well, but the effect is not as robust as the previous one. Holding a qualification 
at O-level or equivalent appears to produce a wage disadvantage when compared to 
individuals with a qualification at an even lower level; this result is generally more significant 
for whites than for nonwhites. 
Part-time work is associated with a strongly lower hourly wage; the coefficient on pt is 
negative and highly significant in regressions on any subsample and with any model 
specification. 
Our results (reported in the Appendix, Tables A4-A8) show that immigrants living in the East 
and South East of England, and in London, generally have higher earnings than immigrants 
living elsewhere. This evidence is more significant for whites than for nonwhites, and, among 
nonwhites, for low-educated individuals. Some negative earning effect can be found for 
nonwhite highly educated immigrants in the North of England (Yorkshire and the Humber, 
North West) and in the East Midlands, but these results are not so robust. 
 
 
5.3 Labour market and education entrants 
 
Following Clark and Lindley (2009), we now carry out an additional part of analysis using 
subsamples of individuals based on the distinction between labour market and education 
entrants (while keeping the disaggregation by ethnic status unchanged). This allows us to 
ascertain whether there is a difference in labour market and pre-labour market assimilation. 
Most studies on the topic we are dealing with focus on the former, while the latter is often 
ignored in the literature. But education entrants generally represent around half the immigrant 
population (in particular, they make up 45.78% of our sample), so not only are they a far too 
relevant group to be simply left out of the study, but they can also provide valuable additional 
information about the mechanisms of economic assimilation. These individuals arrived in the 
UK at an earlier stage of their life, and therefore they have been exposed to the English 
language and culture more deeply and for longer than labour market entrants, and their 
education has been (partially or fully) acquired in the UK. A comparison between the two 
groups not only allows us to see if education entrants have economic performances that are   28
closer to the natives’, but can also give us some insight about the different value that the 
labour market attaches to national and foreign educational qualifications. 
Following the results of the LR and Wald tests in the employment regressions, and of some of 
the F-tests for the earnings equations
20, we decide to use here Model (C). 
Results are presented in Table 11. Once again, the hypothesis of a positive assimilation of 
migrants is confirmed by evidence, with the coefficient of YSM being positive and highly 
significant for both whites and nonwhites, and for both labour market and education entrants. 
Work experience yields positive but decreasing returns on earnings for all categories, while it 
seems to positively affect the probability of being in paid employment more for education 
entrants than for labour market entrants. The picture that emerges is therefore that for labour 
market entrants, YSM – and therefore experience on the British labour market – is more 
relevant than the overall working experience, as in the regression for labour market entrants 
the variable YSM obviously captures the additional value that the market attaches to 
experience in the destination country with respect to that accrued in the home country. 
Again, there seems to be some evidence that the unobserved quality of arrival cohorts has 
risen over time, and this seems to hold especially for education entrants. 
As for the other variables, the estimates basically follow the results already noted earlier in 
the paper. Being married and having children in pre-school age appears to decrease the 
employment probability of the individual, while there seems to be an earnings disadvantage 
for working part-time. Living in London, the South-East and the East of England appears to 
be connected with higher hourly wages
21. 
                                                 
20 For the earnings equations, however, the results of the tests are less clear-cut. For example, evidence in favour 
of Model (C) is found in Table 7, in regressions on samples of whites disaggregated by level of education, and 
for highly educated nonwhites in the following Table, while we find a different result for low-educated whites. 
21 Once again, estimates for the parameters of the regional dummies are shown in the Appendix, Table A13, 
which also includes the exogenous variables used in the first stage of Heckman, showing the detail about the 
exclusion restrictions. Table 11. Education and labour market entrants 
             
  Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment   Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage  
 Whites  Nonwhites  Whites  Nonwhites 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
   Education entrants  LM entrants  Education entrants LM  entrants Education entrants  LM entrants  Education entrants  LM entrants 
exper  0.0426 ***  -0.0168   0.0529 ***  -0.0012     0.0561 *** 0.0643 ***  0.039 *** 0.0271  *** 
  (0.0153)  (0.0146)  (0.0143)  (0.0139)     (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0076)  (0.0073)   
expersq_div100  -0.135 ***  -0.0073    -0.1763 ***  -0.0279    -0.1345 ***  -0.1797 ***  -0.1016 ***  -0.0885  *** 
   (0.0479)    (0.0471)    (0.0453)    (0.0437)    (0.0223)    (0.0245)    (0.0228)    (0.0233)    
YSM  0.0307 *** 0.0497 *** 0.0322 *** 0.0464 *** 0.0175 *** 0.0171 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0171  *** 
  (0.0071)  (0.0082)  (0.0065)  (0.0065)     (0.0035)  (0.0054)  (0.0031)  (0.0042)   
degree  0.4353 ***  0.4207 ***  0.6299 ***  0.4047 ***  0.5204 ***  0.3463 ***  0.7258 ***  0.4919  *** 
   (0.0841)    (0.0857)    (0.0779)    (0.0667)    (0.0457)    (0.0432)    (0.0520)    (0.0371)    
a_level  0.2753 *** 0.235 *** 0.284 ***  0.1024 *  0.1864 ***  -0.1309 ***  0.2659 *** 0.084  *** 
  (0.0759)  (0.0700)  (0.0672)  (0.0613)     (0.0407)  (0.0377)  (0.0402)  (0.0323)   
o_level  0.0761    -0.2241    0.1025    0.0368    0.0481    -0.2132 ***  0.0934** **  -0.0846    
   (0.0884)    (0.1415)    (0.0809)    (0.1050)    (0.0448)    (0.0755)    (0.0424)    (0.0540)    
married  0.6531 ***  0.375 ***  0.5742 ***  0.5006 ***         
  (0.0716)  (0.0634)  (0.0705)  (0.0586)              
dkid04  -0.209 ***  -0.1065    -0.2006 ***  -0.1304 **                      
   (0.0789)    (0.0676)    (0.0670)    (0.0507)                        
dkid59  -0.0866   -0.0988   0.0418   -0.0548            
  (0.0802)  (0.0709)  (0.0648)  (0.0516)              
dkid1015  -0.1304    -0.1663 **  -0.0145    -0.0107                        
   (0.0821)    (0.0814)    (0.0682)    (0.0608)                        
pt            -0.3842 *** -0.5479 *** -0.4115 *** -0.3711  *** 
            (0.0555)  (0.0490)  (0.0426)  (0.0297)   
d50  -4.8315         -1.3183 ***       0.3902         -1.3012 ***       
   (.)         (0.3273)         (0.4084)         (0.1570)         
d60 -4.6278 ***    -1.0538 ***  -1.1284 ***  0.5063     -1.1618 ***     
 (0.1042)     (0.2219)   (0.2076)     (0.4078)     (0.1112)      
d70  -4.3813 ***  0.3645    -0.8746 ***  -0.7727 ***  0.6756 *  -0.1124    -0.9287 ***  -0.0648    
   (0.1317)    (0.2311)    (0.2015)    (0.1222)    (0.4099)    (0.1760)    (0.0988)    (0.1085)    
d80  -3.961 *** 0.8048 ***  -0.6685 ***  -0.5666 *** 0.8487 **  0.0157   -0.6608 *** 0.0899   
  (0.1702)  (0.2481)  (0.1856)  (0.0792)     (0.4143)  (0.1927)  (0.0877)  (0.1178)   
d90  -3.6494 ***  1.1353 ***  -0.3212 *  -0.2889    1.1309 ***  0.2677    -0.3651 ***  0.2888  ** 
   (0.2210)    (0.2690)    (0.1869)    (0.0566)    (0.4212)    (0.2121)    (0.0800)    (0.1301)    
d00  -3.5476 ***  1.4215 ***       1.3285 ***  0.3567    0.5308  *** 
  (0.3057)   (0.2807)       (0.4358)   (0.2232)    (0.1423)   
_cons  4.2441 ***  0.1024    0.6193 **  0.8825 ***  0.5046    1.4751 ***  1.6289 ***  1.4654  *** 
   (0.2724)    (0.3126)    (0.2502)    (0.1564)    (0.4422)    (0.2492)    (0.1286)    (0.1870)    
lambda         -0.7019 ***  -0.7416 ***  -0.0994   -0.3665  *** 
                       (0.1400)    (0.2060)    (0.1174)    (0.1193)    
N  5714    6229    4930    6365    3732    3658    2685    3659    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies included in the regressions. Coefficients of regional dummies showed in Table A13 - Appendix   
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Again, we compute marginal effects of the Probit for employment for an individual with the 
characteristics of the average immigrant, i.e. a higher degree, married, with at least one child 
aged 4 or below, living in the London area (interviewed in quarter 2). Assuming the 
individual arrived in the 1970s, we calculate the employment probability of a white and a 
nonwhite immigrant with different levels of experience and number of YSM. For education 
entrants, we consider individuals who arrived 5 years before starting work, that is individuals 
with 5 years of education in the UK, who therefore achieved their highest qualification in the 
country. We compute probabilities for individuals with 5, 10 and 15 years for experience and, 
respectively, 10, 15 and 20 years of residence in the country. As for labour market entrants, 
we consider immigrants who worked 5 years before arriving to the UK, and compute 
probabilities with exper=10, 15 and 20, and therefore YSM=5, 10 and 15 respectively. We 
then compare the estimated probabilities to that of a native with the same characteristics and 
years of experience. The resulting employment probability differentials, reported in Table 12, 
show that for both education and labour market entrants, the gap with respect to natives of the 
same ethnic group is reduced as YSM increase; however, the gap for education entrants 
appears to be systematically lower than the one for labour market entrants. 
 
Table 12. Predicted employment probability differences wrt natives, using model C 
             
    Education Entrants  Labour Market Entrants     
exper YSM  White Nonwhite White Nonwhite  exper YSM 
5  10  -0.0636 -0.0785 -0.0786 -0.1023 10  5 
10  15  -0.0342 -0.0441 -0.0518 -0.0716 15  10 
15  20  -0.0189 -0.0275 -0.0372 -0.0573 20  15 
 
 
5.4 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
 
An additional part of the study is carried out using the Blinder-Oaxaca (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973) decomposition, a methodology by which differences in a particular outcome 
between two groups can be decomposed into two components; the first one is a differential 
that is accounted for by differences in productivity characteristics, for example education or 
work experience (i.e. different ‘endowments’ across groups); the second one is attributable to 
differences in the returns to these characteristics (i.e. different ‘coefficients’ for the groups). 
This second component, which is the ‘unexplained’ part of the gap, is generally used as a   31
measure for discrimination (although it could obviously be connected to differences in 
unobserved determinants of the outcome considered).  
We try to apply this technique to two pairs of groups, the first one being immigrants/natives, 
the second one white/nonwhite immigrants. It should be pointed out, however, that the model 
used for the two groups needs to be the same; this implies that in the comparison between the 
migrant and the native population, we cannot include those variables which are specific to 
immigrants, i.e. YSM and arrival cohort dummies. This of course might bias the results we 
obtain; nevertheless, we think this methodology can provide some interesting insight, and 
therefore we try it anyway, still bearing in mind this potential drawback. 
The results, presented in Table 13, show a decomposition of each of the four gaps 
(employment and earnings for immigrant/native and white/nonwhite immigrant) in three 
parts; as already said, the first term shows the gap component connected to differences in 
endowments; the second term is related to coefficient differences, and quantifies the change in 
immigrants’ (white immigrants for the second pair of groups) employment probability/wage if 
they had the same characteristics as the native population (nonwhite immigrants); the third 
one is an interaction between the first two, accounting for simultaneity of the endowments 
and coefficients differences between the two groups (Jann, 2008).  
 
Table 13. Predicted employment probability differences wrt natives, using model C 
                
PANEL A - Employment  
Immigrants and natives   
PANEL C - Employment  
White and nonwhite immigrants 
1. Native - 2. Immigrant    1. Nonwhite immigrant - 2. White immigrant 
                
emp  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z    Emp  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z 
Endowments 0.0292  0.0113  0.0100    Endowments  -0.0871  0.0146  0.0000 
Coefficients 0.1259  0.0143  0.0000    Coefficients  -0.2517  0.0320  0.0000 
Interaction 0.0764  0.0122  0.0000    Interaction    0.0119  0.0216  0.5800 
Observed gap  0.2315       Observed gap  -0.3269     
                
                
PANEL B - Earnings  
Immigrants and natives   
PANEL D - Earnings  
White and nonwhite immigrants 
1. Native - 2. Immigrant    1. Nonwhite immigrant - 2. White immigrant 
                
lnhourpay Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>z    Lnhourpay Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>z 
Endowments -0.0717  0.0064  0.0000    Endowments    0.0302  0.0098  0.0020 
Coefficients -0.1158  0.0220  0.0000    Coefficients  -0.2463  0.0392  0.0000 
Interaction   0.0477  0.0065  0.0000    Interaction  -0.0737  0.0117  0.0000 
Observed gap  -0.1398       Observed gap  -0.2898     
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As far as the first pair (immigrants/natives) is concerned, results seem to suggest that there is 
some discrimination against the foreign-born as for the probability of being in paid 
employment (as the positive sign of the second component in Panel A indicates), while there 
appears to be discrimination in the opposite direction for earnings (Panel B). This result is 
clearly unexpected, and might be explained by the problem discussed earlier, i.e. the 
impossibility to use a common model for both groups. 
The evidence concerning white and nonwhite immigrants is probably more reliable. Both for 
the employment probability and for earnings, results indicate that a problem of discrimination 
can arise, as suggested by the negative sign of the second term in Panels C and D. This 
corresponds to the prior expectation that we can have about the existence of a discrimination 
against this category of foreign-born individuals, suggested by a large number of studies (and 





Using data from the British QLFS from 1992 to 2009, we tried to find evidence in support of 
the theory of migrants’ economic assimilation. Our results confirm the hypothesis that labour 
market outcomes of the foreign-born improve with duration of stay in the UK. We also find 
that the performance gap suffered by migrants is significantly lower for education entrants 
when compared to labour market entrants.  
There is a considerable evidence in the empirical literature that nonwhite immigrants face a 
relevant performance gap when compared to their white counterparts: again, our estimates 
support what appears to be now a well known fact. This is confirmed also by the 
decomposition analysis, which suggests that the differential is related to some form of 
discrimination against this ethnic group.  
Further studies on the topic could be developed in several directions. It could be interesting to 
see how second-generation migrants perform relative to the natives and first-generation 
migrants. Also, an increasing literature shows that migrant networks can provide a wide range 
of economic benefits at both macro- and micro-levels, smoothing the informational 
constraints that limit the international flows of goods and capitals on one side, while 
facilitating the process of job search of recent migrants on the other. A connection between 
the effects of networks and the performance of the foreign-born on the labour market of the   33
host country might provide some new insight, although data availability might represent a 
significant problem.   34
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Appendix 
 
We include in the Appendix estimates of the parameters relative to regional dummies in the 
Probit regressions for the employment probability (Tables A1-A4) and for the Heckman 
Selectivity Models for the earnings (structural) equation (Tables A5-A8). 
We also present the first stage Probit regressions for the Heckman estimates (Tables A9-A12), 
mainly to show the relevance of the exogenous variables used in the selection equation.  
Finally, we provide the same data for the regressions for education and labour market entrants 
(Table A13). 
 
 Table A1. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Whites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 2) 
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
  1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
North_East  -0.2065    -0.2431     -0.2083    -0.2406    -0.209    -0.2446    -0.2164    -0.2437    -0.2131    -0.2465    
  (0.2783)  (0.1611)   (0.2783)  (0.1611)  (0.2778)  (0.1611)  (0.2773)  (0.1611)  (0.2799)  (0.1612)   
North_West  -0.1349    -0.1891  *  -0.1357    -0.1912 *  -0.1421    -0.1881 *  -0.1453    -0.1917 *  -0.1367    -0.1891  * 
   (0.2026)    (0.1137)     (0.2028)    (0.1138)    (0.2023)    (0.1137)    (0.2027)    (0.1138)    (0.2039)    (0.1139)    
Yorks_Hum  -0.2735  -0.0693   -0.2735  -0.0689  -0.2653  -0.0688  -0.2569  -0.0679  -0.2656  -0.0648   
  (0.1994)  (0.1185)   (0.1996)  (0.1186)  (0.1995)  (0.1185)  (0.2003)  (0.1187)  (0.2012)  (0.1189)   
East_Mids  -0.2058    -0.0341     -0.2088    -0.032    -0.205    -0.0312    -0.2097    -0.025    -0.2189    -0.0232    
   (0.2182)    (0.1226)     (0.2183)    (0.1228)    (0.2181)    (0.1226)    (0.2183)    (0.1230)    (0.2186)    (0.1231)    
West_Mids  0.0916  -0.2335  **  0.0918  -0.2368 **  0.0919  -0.2316 ** 0.099  -0.2357 **  0.0825  -0.2356  ** 
  (0.2432)  (0.1144)   (0.2435)  (0.1145)  (0.2431)  (0.1144)  (0.2444)  (0.1146)  (0.2443)  (0.1147)   
Eastern  -0.1671    0.2025  *  -0.1723    0.1991 *  -0.1608    0.2029 *  -0.1706    0.196 *  -0.1624    0.1977  * 
   (0.1793)    (0.1057)     (0.1796)    (0.1058)    (0.1794)    (0.1057)    (0.1796)    (0.1059)    (0.1804)    (0.1059)    
London  -0.1719  -0.0841    -0.174  -0.0931  -0.1755  -0.0829   -0.18  -0.1011  -0.1688  -0.1046   
  (0.1493)  (0.0874)   (0.1495)  (0.0877)  (0.1491)  (0.0874)  (0.1495)  (0.0878)  (0.1500)  (0.0881)   
South_East  -0.142    0.1834  *  -0.144    0.1813 *  -0.1386    0.1847 *  -0.1397    0.1801 *  -0.1291    0.1812  * 
   (0.1587)    (0.0980)     (0.1589)    (0.0981)    (0.1586)    (0.0980)    (0.1588)    (0.0982)    (0.1595)    (0.0983)    
South_West  0.1151  0.1476   0.1129  0.1464  0.1238  0.1477  0.1268  0.1449  0.1393  0.1467   
  (0.2064)  (0.1153)   (0.2068)  (0.1153)  (0.2064)  (0.1153)  (0.2074)  (0.1154)  (0.2081)  (0.1155)   
Wales  0.2114    0.0573     0.2094    0.0538    0.2199    0.0578    0.2221    0.0511    0.2204    0.0505    
   (0.3305)    (0.1776)     (0.3312)    (0.1775)    (0.3319)    (0.1777)    (0.3349)    (0.1775)    (0.3348)    (0.1777)    
                               
Table A2. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 3) 
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
North_East  -0.3296  -0.2034   -0.3329  -0.2039  -0.3343  -0.2116  -0.3362  -0.2071  -0.3433  -0.2039   
  (0.2571)  (0.2074)   (0.2574)  (0.2074)  (0.2575)  (0.2072)  (0.2575)  (0.2073)  (0.2573)  (0.2073)   
North_West  0.063    -0.3108  **  0.0600    -0.3113 **  0.0668    -0.3134 **  0.0777    -0.3144 **  0.0727    -0.3114  ** 
   (0.1946)    (0.1437)     (0.1947)    (0.1437)    (0.1948)    (0.1437)    (0.1951)    (0.1438)    (0.1952)    (0.1439)    
Yorks_Hum  0.0444  -0.1881    0.0415  -0.1878   0.0482  -0.1883   0.0535  -0.1877   0.0439  -0.1859   
  (0.2059)  (0.1433)   (0.2061)  (0.1433)  (0.2064)  (0.1432)  (0.2064)  (0.1433)  (0.2065)  (0.1434)   
East_Mids  -0.108    0.0382     -0.1097    0.037    -0.1136    0.0342    -0.1139    0.0293    -0.1145    0.0312    
   (0.2086)    (0.1566)     (0.2086)    (0.1566)    (0.2086)    (0.1566)    (0.2087)    (0.1568)    (0.2087)    (0.1568)    
West_Mids  -0.0894  -0.3418  **  -0.0917  -0.3418 **  -0.0924  -0.3431 **  -0.0846  -0.3439 **  -0.0899  -0.3420  ** 
  (0.1875)  (0.1386)   (0.1876)  (0.1386)  (0.1876)  (0.1386)  (0.1877)  (0.1387)  (0.1877)  (0.1388)   
Eastern  0.1646    0.1499     0.1601    0.1498    0.1539    0.1457    0.1592    0.1425    0.1455    0.1444    
   (0.2006)    (0.1554)     (0.2008)    (0.1554)    (0.2007)    (0.1554)    (0.2007)    (0.1555)    (0.2009)    (0.1556)    
London  -0.0549   -0.171   -0.0579  -0.1711  -0.0588  -0.1752  -0.0588  -0.1786  -0.0691  -0.1766   
  (0.1609)  (0.1323)   (0.1611)  (0.1323)  (0.1609)  (0.1322)  (0.1608)  (0.1324)  (0.1610)  (0.1324)   
South_East  0.2344    0.1839     0.2343    0.184    0.2276    0.183    0.226    0.1796    0.2222    0.1794    
   (0.1856)    (0.1485)     (0.1858)    (0.1485)    (0.1857)    (0.1485)    (0.1855)    (0.1486)    (0.1856)    (0.1486)    
South_West  0.3328  0.2159   0.3338  0.2159  0.3204  0.2157  0.3305  0.2144  0.3280  0.2102   
  (0.2565)  (0.1915)   (0.2568)  (0.1915)  (0.2561)  (0.1917)  (0.2564)  (0.1920)  (0.2571)  (0.1919)   
Wales  -0.0161    0.2004     -0.021    0.2019    -0.0279    0.203    -0.0221    0.1985    -0.0326    0.1967    
   (0.2784)    (0.2293)     (0.2784)    (0.2293)    (0.2780)    (0.2293)    (0.2781)    (0.2294)    (0.2782)    (0.2294)    
***  1%,  **  5%,  *  10%  significant  level.                                Table A3. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Whites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 4) 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
   1 - Married  2 - Unmarried  3 - Married  4 - Unmarried  5 - Married  6 - Unmarried  7 - Married  8 - Unmarried  9 - Married  10 - Unmarried 
North_East -0.1421 -0.2608    -0.141 -0.2608 -0.1447 -0.2583 -0.1445 -0.2514 -0.1363   -0.2474   
  (0.1863)  (0.2110)   (0.1863)  (0.2110)  (0.1863)  (0.2107)  (0.1866)  (0.2105)  (0.1881)  (0.2107)   
North_West  -0.1456    -0.2225     -0.1458    -0.2226    -0.1479    -0.2145    -0.1498    -0.2168    -0.1462    -0.2185    
   (0.1308)    (0.1507)     (0.1309)    (0.1507)    (0.1309)    (0.1508)    (0.1310)    (0.1508)    (0.1314)    (0.1509)    
Yorks_Hum  0.0822  -0.3257  **  0.0824  -0.3256 **  0.0804  -0.3159 **  0.0818  -0.3093 ** 0.085  -0.3081  ** 
  (0.1445)  (0.1502)   (0.1446)  (0.1503)  (0.1445)  (0.1504)  (0.1447)  (0.1506)  (0.1451)  (0.1505)   
East_Mids  -0.0294    -0.0986     -0.0303    -0.0983    -0.0268    -0.0955    -0.0342    -0.0863    -0.0184    -0.0854    
   (0.1410)    (0.1656)     (0.1410)    (0.1657)    (0.1411)    (0.1654)    (0.1412)    (0.1657)    (0.1420)    (0.1657)    
West_Mids  -0.1026  -0.2475   -0.1042  -0.2475   -0.101  -0.2418  -0.1024  -0.2403  -0.0956   -0.239   
  (0.1357)  (0.1546)   (0.1358)  (0.1546)  (0.1357)  (0.1548)  (0.1359)  (0.1549)  (0.1361)  (0.1550)   
Eastern  0.2478 **  -0.0484     0.2463 **  -0.0485    0.2462 **  -0.039    0.2417 **  -0.0392    0.251 **  -0.0381    
   (0.1227)    (0.1381)     (0.1227)    (0.1381)    (0.1227)    (0.1382)    (0.1230)    (0.1383)    (0.1232)    (0.1382)    
London  -0.0566  -0.1579   -0.0585   -0.158  -0.0565  -0.1562  -0.0638  -0.1621  -0.0599  -0.1571   
  (0.0991)  (0.1163)   (0.0992)  (0.1163)  (0.0991)  (0.1164)  (0.0995)  (0.1164)  (0.0997)  (0.1166)   
South_East  0.1274    0.0848     0.1268    0.0847    0.1256    0.0932    0.1222    0.0959    0.1269    0.098    
   (0.1076)    (0.1297)     (0.1076)    (0.1297)    (0.1076)    (0.1298)    (0.1079)    (0.1299)    (0.1080)    (0.1299)    
South_West  0.124  0.1794   0.1234  0.1794  0.1225  0.1828  0.1212  0.1855  0.1328  0.1893   
  (0.1328)  (0.1525)   (0.1328)  (0.1525)  (0.1328)  (0.1527)  (0.1330)  (0.1527)  (0.1334)  (0.1527)   
Wales  0.4061    -0.1626     0.4057    -0.1629    0.406    -0.156    0.4053    -0.1622    0.4036    -0.1606    
   (0.2554)    (0.2116)     (0.2552)    (0.2116)    (0.2556)    (0.2120)    (0.2549)    (0.2124)    (0.2542)    (0.2123)    
                                
Table A4. Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 5) 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
   1 - Married  2 - Unmarried  3 - Married  4 - Unmarried  5 - Married  6 - Unmarried  7 - Married  8 - Unmarried  9 - Married  10 - Unmarried 
North_East  -0.1875 -0.3824   -0.1879 -0.3846 -0.1979 -0.3792 -0.1927 -0.3786 -0.1941  -0.3702   
  (0.1952)  (0.2949)   (0.1952)  (0.2950)  (0.1951)  (0.2944)  (0.1952)  (0.2944)  (0.1956)  (0.2955)   
North_West  -0.1626    -0.2656     -0.1652    -0.2644    -0.167    -0.2617    -0.1614    -0.258    -0.1646    -0.244    
   (0.1337)    (0.2170)     (0.1338)    (0.2169)    (0.1338)    (0.2169)    (0.1339)    (0.2171)    (0.1341)    (0.2178)    
Yorks_Hum  -0.1755  0.0368    -0.1764  0.0365   -0.1754  0.0397   -0.1683  0.0401   -0.1721  0.0626   
  (0.1338)  (0.2211)   (0.1338)  (0.2211)  (0.1339)  (0.2210)  (0.1339)  (0.2211)  (0.1342)  (0.2220)   
East_Mids  -0.0164    0.115     -0.0198    0.1129    -0.0254    0.1159    -0.026    0.12    -0.0314    0.1264    
   (0.1459)    (0.2422)     (0.1461)    (0.2423)    (0.1460)    (0.2424)    (0.1461)    (0.2426)    (0.1463)    (0.2430)    
West_Mids  -0.2301 * -0.3762  * -0.2325 * -0.3726 * -0.2345 * -0.3643 * -0.2278 * -0.3631 * -0.2342 * -0.3513  * 
  (0.1286)  (0.2107)   (0.1287)  (0.2108)  (0.1287)  (0.2106)  (0.1288)  (0.2107)  (0.1290)  (0.2114)   
Eastern  0.0656    0.3565     0.0638    0.3558    0.0586    0.3505    0.0628    0.3515    0.0591    0.3666    
   (0.1449)    (0.2288)     (0.1450)    (0.2287)    (0.1451)    (0.2287)    (0.1450)    (0.2288)    (0.1453)    (0.2297)    
London  -0.131  -0.1034   -0.1336  -0.1006  -0.1409  -0.0984  -0.1377  -0.0979  -0.1429  -0.0857   
  (0.1212)  (0.1916)   (0.1213)  (0.1916)  (0.1214)  (0.1914)  (0.1213)  (0.1916)  (0.1216)  (0.1922)   
South_East  0.1364    0.3849  *  0.1338    0.3931 *  0.1285    0.4072 *  0.1313    0.4059 *  0.1279    0.4032  * 
   (0.1368)    (0.2181)     (0.1369)    (0.2183)    (0.1370)    (0.2184)    (0.1369)    (0.2186)    (0.1372)    (0.2191)    
South_West  0.4187 **  0.1356   0.4161 **  0.1438  0.4074 *  0.1567  0.4084 **  0.1591  0.4058 *  0.1526   
  (0.2077)  (0.2494)   (0.2077)  (0.2496)  (0.2080)  (0.2499)  (0.2080)  (0.2503)  (0.2081)  (0.2506)   
Wales  0.1186    0.0948     0.1183    0.0987    0.1194    0.0898    0.1236    0.0909    0.1234    0.0983    
   (0.2208)    (0.3021)     (0.2209)    (0.3020)    (0.2211)    (0.3011)    (0.2210)    (0.3015)    (0.2212)    (0.3025)    
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level.                               Table A5. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Whites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 7) 
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
North_East  -0.0389   -0.063   -0.0429  -0.0635   -0.061  -0.0678  -0.0583  -0.0671  -0.0622  -0.0635   
  (0.2520)  (0.0980)   (0.2388)  (0.0983)  (0.1940)  (0.0889)  (0.1912)  (0.0847)  (0.1953)  (0.0856)   
North_West  0.0848    0.0088     0.0817    0.0102    0.051    0.0071    0.0523    -0.0002    0.0513    0.0029    
   (0.1749)    (0.0706)     (0.1658)    (0.0709)    (0.1350)    (0.0640)    (0.1330)    (0.0611)    (0.1360)    (0.0618)    
Yorks_Hum  0.1243   -0.0671   0.1197   -0.0673  0.0984   -0.0633  0.0953   -0.0686  0.0939   -0.0657   
  (0.1797)  (0.0660)   (0.1703)  (0.0662)  (0.1384)  (0.0598)  (0.1362)  (0.0570)  (0.1394)  (0.0577)   
East_Mids  0.0969    -0.0031     0.0958    -0.0029    0.0701    0.0126    0.072    0.0102    0.0706    0.0133    
   (0.1969)    (0.0679)     (0.1867)    (0.0682)    (0.1517)    (0.0616)    (0.1495)    (0.0587)    (0.1531)    (0.0594)    
West_Mids  -0.0082   0.0381   -0.0031   0.0399  -0.0018   0.0436  -0.0034   0.0333  -0.0024   0.0365   
  (0.1826)  (0.0684)   (0.1731)  (0.0688)  (0.1406)  (0.0621)  (0.1385)  (0.0592)  (0.1416)  (0.0599)   
Eastern  0.1806    0.1159  **  0.1814    0.1171 **  0.1628    0.125 **  0.1651    0.1234 **  0.1605    0.1235  ** 
   (0.1536)    (0.0576)     (0.1456)    (0.0578)    (0.1183)    (0.0523)    (0.1166)    (0.0498)    (0.1190)    (0.0503)    
London  0.438 *** 0.2995  *** 0.4326 *** 0.3034 *** 0.4014 *** 0.3024 *** 0.4005 *** 0.2925 *** 0.3961 *** 0.2987  *** 
  (0.1304)  (0.0515)   (0.1236)  (0.0519)  (0.1009)  (0.0467)  (0.0994)  (0.0448)  (0.1012)  (0.0454)   
South_East  0.2251 *  0.2068  *** 0.2217 *  0.208 *** 0.2043 **  0.2172 *** 0.2049 **  0.2167 *** 0.1991 *  0.2174  *** 
   (0.1331)    (0.0539)     (0.1261)    (0.0541)    (0.1026)    (0.0490)    (0.1010)    (0.0466)    (0.1032)    (0.0472)    
South_West  -0.0331  -0.0647   -0.0234  -0.0636  -0.0138  -0.0602  -0.0137  -0.0609  -0.0187  -0.0596   
  (0.1604)  (0.0620)   (0.1520)  (0.0622)  (0.1236)  (0.0562)  (0.1217)  (0.0535)  (0.1246)  (0.0541)   
Wales  -0.1754    -0.1391     -0.1737    -0.1388    -0.1768    -0.1353    -0.1746    -0.1299    -0.1793    -0.1288    
   (0.2367)    (0.0937)     (0.2244)    (0.0941)    (0.1823)    (0.0850)    (0.1795)    (0.0810)    (0.1837)    (0.0819)    
                  
Table A6. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Nonwhites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 8) 
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
North_East  -0.1118   0.0989   -0.1197   0.0997  -0.1539   0.0908  -0.1527   0.0913  -0.1471   0.0875   
  (0.1573)  (0.1222)   (0.1518)  (0.1221)  (0.1255)  (0.1217)  (0.1253)  (0.1211)  (0.1284)  (0.1208)   
North_West  -0.1602    -0.0883     -0.1601    -0.0889    -0.1717 **  -0.0935    -0.175 **  -0.0992    -0.1812 **  -0.0999    
   (0.1039)    (0.0824)     (0.1000)    (0.0823)    (0.0817)    (0.0821)    (0.0818)    (0.0816)    (0.0842)    (0.0814)    
Yorks_Hum  -0.209 *  -0.0334   -0.2097 **  -0.034  -0.2153 **  -0.0346  -0.2164 **  -0.036  -0.2208 **  -0.0359   
  (0.1075)  (0.0775)   (0.1034)  (0.0775)  (0.0845)  (0.0771)  (0.0846)  (0.0767)  (0.0870)  (0.0766)   
East_Mids  -0.1675    -0.0042     -0.1662    -0.0028    -0.1725 *  -0.0128    -0.175 **  -0.0136    -0.1816 **  -0.013    
   (0.1124)    (0.0824)     (0.1081)    (0.0824)    (0.0884)    (0.0821)    (0.0883)    (0.0816)    (0.0908)    (0.0815)    
West_Mids  -0.1165  -0.0075   -0.1178  -0.0079  -0.1291  -0.0116  -0.1308 *  -0.0148  -0.1323  -0.0114   
  (0.1000)  (0.0762)   (0.0962)  (0.0762)  (0.0787)  (0.0759)  (0.0786)  (0.0754)  (0.0808)  (0.0753)   
Eastern  0.0626    0.1484  *  0.0622    0.1486 *  0.0629    0.1458 *  0.0632    0.1476 *  0.0589    0.1424  * 
   (0.1026)    (0.0806)     (0.0987)    (0.0806)    (0.0807)    (0.0802)    (0.0807)    (0.0797)    (0.0830)    (0.0797)    
London  0.0608  0.1887  *** 0.0591   0.189 *** 0.0447  0.1844 *** 0.044  0.1831 **  0.0431  0.1848  *** 
  (0.0868)  (0.0719)   (0.0835)  (0.0719)  (0.0684)  (0.0716)  (0.0683)  (0.0711)  (0.0703)  (0.0710)   
South_East  0.0107    0.2236  *** 0.0116    0.2237 *** 0.0178    0.2209 *** 0.0179    0.2219 *** 0.0115    0.2195  *** 
   (0.0962)    (0.0781)     (0.0926)    (0.0781)    (0.0758)    (0.0777)    (0.0758)    (0.0772)    (0.0780)    (0.0771)    
South_West  -0.0762   0.0415   -0.0732   0.0417  -0.0646   0.0372  -0.0676   0.0374  -0.0733   0.0167   
  (0.1198)  (0.0952)   (0.1154)  (0.0952)  (0.0943)  (0.0947)  (0.0945)  (0.0942)  (0.0973)  (0.0941)   
Wales  -0.0356    -0.0894     -0.0366    -0.0879    -0.0546    -0.0901    -0.0562    -0.0832    -0.0435    -0.0803    
   (0.1577)    (0.1151)     (0.1518)    (0.1151)    (0.1244)    (0.1145)    (0.1242)    (0.1139)    (0.1280)    (0.1138)    
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level.                                        Table A7. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Whites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 9) 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
  1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
North_East  -0.0917  -0.0702   -0.0917  -0.0703  -0.1026  -0.0755  -0.1051  -0.0734   -0.1  -0.0661   
  (0.0694)  (0.0985)   (0.0690)  (0.0985)  (0.0685)  (0.0944)  (0.0691)  (0.0939)  (0.0685)  (0.0954)   
North_West  0.0018    -0.0231     0.0047    -0.0242    -0.0047    -0.0345    -0.0107    -0.0442    -0.0103    -0.0292    
   (0.0494)    (0.0736)     (0.0492)    (0.0738)    (0.0488)    (0.0704)    (0.0492)    (0.0706)    (0.0488)    (0.0717)    
Yorks_Hum  -0.0157  -0.0011   -0.0171  -0.0016  -0.0234  -0.0088  -0.0225  -0.0069  -0.0263   0.0011   
  (0.0474)  (0.0739)   (0.0472)  (0.0739)  (0.0468)  (0.0701)  (0.0472)  (0.0692)  (0.0468)  (0.0702)   
East_Mids  0.0154    -0.0226     0.0191    -0.023    0.0286    -0.0132    0.0263    -0.0059    0.0256    -0.0067    
   (0.0494)    (0.0704)     (0.0491)    (0.0703)    (0.0487)    (0.0673)    (0.0492)    (0.0666)    (0.0488)    (0.0677)    
West_Mids  0.0456   -0.0526   0.0508   -0.0537  0.0595   -0.0634  0.0549   -0.0687  0.0574   -0.0693   
  (0.0484)  (0.0729)   (0.0482)  (0.0729)  (0.0478)  (0.0697)  (0.0483)  (0.0692)  (0.0479)  (0.0704)   
Eastern  0.1792 ***  0.1452  **  0.1778 *** 0.1443 **  0.1751 ***  0.1484 *** 0.1776 *** 0.1436 **  0.1752 ***  0.1434  ** 
   (0.0423)    (0.0591)     (0.0420)    (0.0592)    (0.0416)    (0.0564)    (0.0418)    (0.0561)    (0.0415)    (0.0569)    
London  0.2711 *** 0.3504  *** 0.2763 *** 0.3499 *** 0.2783 *** 0.3366 *** 0.2725 *** 0.3305 *** 0.2779 *** 0.3343  *** 
  (0.0363)  (0.0546)   (0.0361)  (0.0548)  (0.0357)  (0.0518)  (0.0361)  (0.0522)  (0.0358)  (0.0527)   
South_East  0.2908 ***  0.1204  **  0.2894 *** 0.1203 **  0.2842 ***  0.1319 *** 0.2857 *** 0.1327 *** 0.2831 ***  0.1273  ** 
   (0.0372)    (0.0532)     (0.0370)    (0.0532)    (0.0367)    (0.0511)    (0.0369)    (0.0511)    (0.0366)    (0.0522)    
South_West  -0.0054   0.0236   -0.0053   0.0232  -0.0084   0.0361  -0.0084   0.033  -0.0112   0.0243   
  (0.0439)  (0.0632)   (0.0436)  (0.0633)  (0.0433)  (0.0606)  (0.0437)  (0.0606)  (0.0433)  (0.0622)   
Wales  -0.0913    -0.0715     -0.0988    -0.0719    -0.1018    -0.0827    -0.0927    -0.0886    -0.0922    -0.0787    
   (0.0682)    (0.0911)     (0.0678)    (0.0910)    (0.0671)    (0.0871)    (0.0677)    (0.0867)    (0.0671)    (0.0882)    
                  
Table A8. Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage - Nonwhites - Regional dummies (Ref. Table 10) 
   Model A  Model B Model C  Model D Model E 
  1 - Married  2 - Unmarried  3 - Married  4 - Unmarried  5 - Married  6 - Unmarried  7 - Married  8 - Unmarried  9 - Married  10 - Unmarried 
North_East  -0.0322  -0.1262   -0.0309  -0.1183  -0.0333  -0.1663  -0.0535  -0.1283  -0.0446  -0.0715   
  (0.1178)  (0.1978)   (0.1214)  (0.1976)  (0.1360)  (0.2002)  (0.1106)  (0.1978)  (0.1324)  (0.1895)   
North_West  -0.0863    0.019     -0.0844    0.0205    -0.0823    -0.0234    -0.1002    -0.0054    -0.0955    0.0345    
   (0.0801)    (0.1296)     (0.0826)    (0.1294)    (0.0922)    (0.1321)    (0.0749)    (0.1297)    (0.0895)    (0.1247)    
Yorks_Hum  -0.0931  -0.0935    -0.092  -0.0885  -0.0929  -0.0904  -0.1024  -0.0718  -0.0984  -0.0666   
  (0.0748)  (0.1116)   (0.0771)  (0.1116)  (0.0863)  (0.1140)  (0.0702)  (0.1135)  (0.0840)  (0.1112)   
East_Mids  -0.1003    -0.0533     -0.1014    -0.0494    -0.1114    -0.0456    -0.1071    -0.0294    -0.1114    -0.0334    
   (0.0799)    (0.1225)     (0.0823)    (0.1224)    (0.0920)    (0.1252)    (0.0749)    (0.1250)    (0.0897)    (0.1216)    
West_Mids  -0.0422  -0.0525   -0.0416  -0.0542  -0.0437  -0.0917  -0.0538  -0.0767  -0.0486  -0.0236   
  (0.0727)  (0.1416)   (0.0749)  (0.1415)  (0.0837)  (0.1424)  (0.0680)  (0.1406)  (0.0815)  (0.1331)   
Eastern  0.0985    0.1541     0.0964    0.16    0.0839    0.1932    0.0912    0.2114    0.0802    0.1753    
   (0.0785)    (0.1329)     (0.0810)    (0.1332)    (0.0901)    (0.1348)    (0.0735)    (0.1363)    (0.0880)    (0.1327)    
London  0.1198 *  0.187  ** 0.1195 *  0.1892 ** 0.1132   0.1851 *  0.109 *  0.1968 ** 0.1108   0.2077  ** 
  (0.0666)  (0.0946)   (0.0686)  (0.0945)  (0.0768)  (0.0967)  (0.0625)  (0.0960)  (0.0748)  (0.0936)   
South_East  0.0998    0.2178     0.0975    0.2157    0.0834    0.2816 **  0.0916    0.2777 **  0.083    0.2254  * 
   (0.0753)    (0.1331)     (0.0777)    (0.1329)    (0.0863)    (0.1390)    (0.0704)    (0.1378)    (0.0844)    (0.1298)    
South_West  -0.0313   0.0373   -0.0347   0.0362  -0.0617   0.0658  -0.0436   0.0735  -0.0641   0.0625   
  (0.1018)  (0.1255)   (0.1049)  (0.1254)  (0.1156)  (0.1296)  (0.0941)  (0.1293)  (0.1129)  (0.1254)   
Wales  -0.0701    -0.1812     -0.0721    -0.1804    -0.0826    -0.1766    -0.078    -0.1732    -0.07    -0.161    
   (0.1167)    (0.1555)     (0.1203)    (0.1554)    (0.1345)    (0.1588)    (0.1095)    (0.1576)    (0.1311)    (0.1541)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses.              Table A9. Heckman Selectivity Model - First stage - Dependent variable: employment - Whites (Ref. Table 7) 
                                
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
emp                                                     
exper  -0.0018   -0.0129  *** -0.0075   -0.0203 *** 0.0185  0.0058  0.0033  0.0011  -0.041  0.0126   
  (0.0070)  (0.0041)   (0.0111)  (0.0058)  (0.0199)  (0.0134)  (0.0336)  (0.0200)  (0.0474)  (0.0250)   
expersq                       -0.0856    -0.0624    -0.069    -0.0923    0.0955    -0.1253    
                        (0.0781)    (0.0426)    (0.1436)    (0.0695)    (0.2167)    (0.0911)    
YSM  0.0314 ***  0.0516  *** 0.0267 ** 0.0409 *** 0.0319 *** 0.052 *** 0.0186   0.0257 **  -0.0818 ** 0.0317   
  (0.0086)  (0.0061)   (0.0112)  (0.0086)  (0.0086)  (0.0061)  (0.0134)  (0.0117)  (0.0414)  (0.0348)   
YSM2                                           0.3666 **  -0.015    
                                            (0.1472)    (0.1405)    
YSM_x_exper       0.0341  0.0551 *     0.1548   0.208 *  1.2478 **  -0.066   
       (0.0518)  (0.0315)      (0.1688)  (0.1220)  (0.6106)  (0.3891)   
YSM_x_expersq                                 -0.0033    -0.0031    -0.037    0.0052    
                                  (0.0062)    (0.0035)    (0.0237)    (0.0117)    
YSM2_x_exper              -0.0388 **  0.0076   
              (0.0182)   (0.0133)   
YSM2_x_expersq                                           0.0011 *  -0.0002    
                                            (0.0006)    (0.0003)    
married  0.5717 *** 0.6054  *** 0.575 *** 0.6033 *** 0.5619 *** 0.5971 *** 0.5645 *** 0.5825 *** 0.56 *** 0.5847  *** 
  (0.0967)  (0.0616)   (0.0969)  (0.0617)  (0.0972)  (0.0619)  (0.0973)  (0.0622)  (0.0977)  (0.0623)   
dkid04  0.0095    -0.1972  *** 0.011    -0.1867 *** -0.0012    -0.2091 *** -0.0051    -0.2034 *** 0.0032    -0.2017  *** 
   (0.1134)    (0.0656)     (0.1133)    (0.0659)    (0.1140)    (0.0661)    (0.1140)    (0.0663)    (0.1144)    (0.0664)    
dkid59  -0.0305  -0.1534  ** -0.03  -0.1487 **  -0.0348  -0.1625 **  -0.0411  -0.1671 **  -0.0226   -0.168  ** 
  (0.1238)  (0.0680)   (0.1238)  (0.0681)  (0.1240)  (0.0683)  (0.1244)  (0.0685)  (0.1249)  (0.0686)   
dkid1015  -0.1115    -0.2274  *** -0.1195    -0.2332 *** -0.0864    -0.2136 *** -0.0882    -0.2114 *** -0.0742    -0.2137  *** 
   (0.1432)    (0.0725)     (0.1438)    (0.0726)    (0.1450)    (0.0731)    (0.1452)    (0.0733)    (0.1457)    (0.0738)    
d50  -3.7554 *** -1.9554  *** -3.7258 *** -1.9878 *** -3.7718 *** -1.9437 *** -3.7413 *** -1.9872 *** -3.6528 *** -1.9936  *** 
  (0.4236)  (0.2515)   (0.4257)  (0.2527)  (0.4260)  (0.2517)  (0.4475)  (0.2533)  (0.4665)  (0.2549)   
d60  -3.7311 ***  -1.5366  *** -3.6537 *** -1.4924 *** -3.7881 ***  -1.5581 *** -3.7047 *** -1.5184 *** -3.5515 ***  -1.4977  *** 
   (0.3282)    (0.1993)     (0.3453)    (0.2006)    (0.3385)    (0.2000)    (0.3579)    (0.2018)    (0.3854)    (0.2049)    
d70  -3.6751 *** -1.1489  *** -3.581 *** -1.0733 *** -3.7285 *** -1.1644 *** -3.5999 *** -1.0388 *** -3.3632 *** -0.9782  *** 
  (0.2692)  (0.1525)   (0.3002)  (0.1584)  (0.2802)  (0.1527)  (0.3166)  (0.1586)  (0.3548)  (0.1700)   
d80  -3.235 ***  -0.6234  *** -3.1504 *** -0.5688 *** -3.2813 ***  -0.6336 *** -3.1659 *** -0.5358 *** -2.8666 ***  -0.4779  *** 
   (0.2188)    (0.1092)     (0.2490)    (0.1136)    (0.2304)    (0.1095)    (0.2708)    (0.1144)    (0.3229)    (0.1280)    
d90  -2.9019 ***  -0.1564  *  -2.834 *** -0.1395 * -2.9485 ***  -0.1613 * -2.8709 *** -0.1318   -2.651 ***  -0.1145   
  (0.1913)  (0.0823)   (0.2131)  (0.0829)  (0.2044)  (0.0824)  (0.2381)  (0.0830)  (0.2820)  (0.0855)   
d00  -2.6531 ***        -2.5938 ***      -2.6972 ***       -2.6355 ***      -2.4877 ***       
   (0.1979)          (0.2138)         (0.2098)         (0.2395)         (0.2765)         
_cons  4.1302  0.8623  *** 4.1232  0.9557 *** 4.0964  0.7649 *** 4.1532  0.8998 *** 4.2921  0.8487  *** 
   (.)    (0.1180)     (.)    (0.1297)    (.)    (0.1352)    (.)    (0.1596)    (.)    (0.1772)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time and regional  dummies  included.                  Table A10. Heckman Selectivity Model - First stage - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites (Ref. Table 8) 
                                
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - High ed.  2 - Low ed.  3 - High ed.  4 - Low ed.  5 - High ed.  6 - Low ed.  7 - High ed.  8 - Low ed.  9 - High ed.  10 - Low ed. 
exper  0.0076   -0.0051   0.0143   -0.0065  0.0493 ***  0.0121  0.0137   -0.0214  0.0194   -0.0307   
  (0.0062)  (0.0039)   (0.0104)  (0.0059)  (0.0186)  (0.0134)  (0.0323)  (0.0220)  (0.0452)  (0.0297)   
expersq_div100                       -0.1679 **  -0.0559    -0.0237    0.0365    -0.0929    0.0807    
                        (0.0705)    (0.0416)    (0.1315)    (0.0737)    (0.1870)    (0.1025)    
YSM  0.0382 ***  0.0471 *** 0.0439 *** 0.0451 *** 0.0387 ***  0.0474 *** 0.0268 *  0.0197   0.0333   -0.0121  
  (0.0079)  (0.0056)   (0.0106)  (0.0084)  (0.0079)  (0.0056)  (0.0139)  (0.0132)  (0.0439)  (0.0406)   
YSM2/100                                           -0.0146    0.1292    
                                            (0.1576)    (0.1633)    
YSM_x_exper/100        -0.0436  0.0113      0.2451  0.3343 **  0.2419  0.5553   
       (0.0548)  (0.0351)      (0.1881)  (0.1471)  (0.6602)  (0.4884)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0092    -0.0086 **  -0.0029    -0.0161    
                                  (0.0067)    (0.0042)    (0.0242)    (0.0146)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              -0.0014   -0.0091   
              (0.0210)   (0.0173)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           -0.0001    0.0003    
                                            (0.0007)    (0.0005)    
married  0.3971 *** 0.6951  *** 0.3951 *** 0.6939 *** 0.3623 *** 0.6905 *** 0.3629 *** 0.6877 *** 0.3636 *** 0.6819  *** 
  (0.0905)  (0.0639)   (0.0906)  (0.0640)  (0.0918)  (0.0640)  (0.0919)  (0.0644)  (0.0921)  (0.0646)   
dkid04  -0.0768    -0.1462  *** -0.0805    -0.1442 *** -0.0957    -0.1561 *** -0.0982    -0.1514 *** -0.1005    -0.1494  *** 
   (0.0872)    (0.0551)     (0.0873)    (0.0555)    (0.0876)    (0.0556)    (0.0878)    (0.0558)    (0.0878)    (0.0558)    
dkid59  0.1702 * -0.0776    0.1653 * -0.0759   0.154   -0.0847   0.1449   -0.0911 *  0.1441   -0.0846   
  (0.0938)  (0.0542)   (0.0940)  (0.0545)  (0.0941)  (0.0545)  (0.0945)  (0.0549)  (0.0945)  (0.0550)   
dkid1015  -0.1112    -0.0646     -0.1089    -0.0659    -0.061    -0.0554    -0.0676    -0.0631    -0.0702    -0.0534    
   (0.1090)    (0.0597)     (0.1091)    (0.0598)    (0.1112)    (0.0601)    (0.1115)    (0.0602)    (0.1116)    (0.0606)    
d50           -1.8642 *** 3.7211        
           (0.3471)   (.)        
d60  -4.4428 ***  0.5975  **  -4.48 *** 0.608 **  -4.4411 ***  -1.2789 *** -1.0999 *** 0.5762 *  -4.6996 ***  0.714  ** 
   (0.3270)    (0.2977)     (0.3329)    (0.2996)    (0.3332)    (0.1663)    (0.2589)    (0.3005)    (0.3897)    (0.3151)    
d70  -4.2494 *** 0.864  *** -4.3157 *** 0.8828 *** -4.2524 ***  -1.0236 *** -0.9118 *** 0.8556 *** -4.5984 *** 1.042  *** 
  (0.2677)  (0.3037)   (0.2851)  (0.3094)  (0.2753)  (0.1312)  (0.1901)  (0.3106)  (0.3499)  (0.3325)   
d80  -4.1878 ***  1.256  *** -4.2549 *** 1.2756 *** -4.1949 ***  -0.6304 *** -0.8515 *** 1.2686 *** -4.5357 ***  1.4651  *** 
   (0.2288)    (0.3209)     (0.2493)    (0.3267)    (0.2382)    (0.0952)    (0.1375)    (0.3275)    (0.3289)    (0.3480)    
d90  -3.7922 *** 1.6216  *** -3.8502 *** 1.638 *** -3.8019 ***  -0.2628 *** -0.4556 *** 1.6242 *** -4.1062 *** 1.7822  *** 
  (0.2083)  (0.3364)   (0.2258)  (0.3404)  (0.2187)  (0.0744)  (0.1111)  (0.3410)  (0.3077)  (0.3549)   
d00  -3.3388 ***  1.8825  *** -3.384 *** 1.8968 *** -3.3416 ***            1.8736 *** -3.6194 ***  2.0019  *** 
   (0.1985)    (0.3471)     (0.2109)    (0.3500)    (0.2083)              (0.3507)    (0.2886)    (0.3613)    
_cons  4.2905  -1.6942  *** 4.2791  -1.6903 *** 4.1397   0.0947   0.9514 *** -1.5386 *** 4.5558  -1.5907  *** 
   (.)    (0.3918)     (.)    (0.3921)    (.)    (0.1893)    (0.2429)    (0.4145)    (.)    (0.4364)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time and regional  dummies  included.                  Table A11. Heckman Selectivity Model - First stage - Dependent variable: employment - Whites (Ref. Table 9) 
                  
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - Married  2 - Unmarried  3 - Married  4 - Unmarried  5 - Married  6 - Unmarried  7 - Married  8 - Unmarried  9 - Married  10 - Unmarried 
exper  -0.0164 ***  -0.0045    -0.0171 **  -0.009  0.0045  0.0301 **  -0.0192  0.0532 **  -0.0126  0.0365   
  (0.0052)  (0.0050)   (0.0071)  (0.0078)  (0.0177)  (0.0142)  (0.0259)  (0.0237)  (0.0336)  (0.0306)   
expersq/100                       -0.067    -0.1307 *** -0.0038    -0.2814 *** -0.0701    -0.2099    
                        (0.0543)    (0.0500)    (0.0861)    (0.0939)    (0.1153)    (0.1284)    
YSM  0.0628 ***  0.0241  *** 0.0617 *** 0.0197 ** 0.063 ***  0.025 *** 0.0403 *** 0.0148  -0.0438  -0.0243   
  (0.0071)  (0.0075)   (0.0103)  (0.0096)  (0.0071)  (0.0075)  (0.0151)  (0.0113)  (0.0481)  (0.0320)   
YSM2/100                                           0.3533 **  0.1449    
                                            (0.1692)    (0.1192)    
YSM_x_exper/100       0.0059  0.0285      0.2547 *  -0.0252  0.6336  0.3857   
       (0.0378)  (0.0387)      (0.1532)  (0.1249)  (0.5444)  (0.4140)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0064    0.0046    -0.0067    -0.0087    
                                  (0.0043)    (0.0041)    (0.0158)    (0.0142)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              -0.0217   -0.0144   
              (0.0170)   (0.0129)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           0.0003    0.0004    
                                            (0.0004)    (0.0004)    
degree  0.4421 *** 0.4531  *** 0.444 *** 0.4637 *** 0.4401 *** 0.4562 *** 0.4506 *** 0.5001 *** 0.454 *** 0.5052  *** 
  (0.0828)  (0.0913)   (0.0838)  (0.0926)  (0.0828)  (0.0915)  (0.0843)  (0.0938)  (0.0841)  (0.0941)   
a_level  0.2799 ***  0.211  **  0.2803 *** 0.2151 **  0.2792 ***  0.2055 **  0.2771 *** 0.2207 *** 0.2929 ***  0.2296  *** 
   (0.0760)    (0.0839)     (0.0761)    (0.0841)    (0.0760)    (0.0841)    (0.0761)    (0.0846)    (0.0765)    (0.0851)    
o_level  0.0652   -0.0114   0.0657   -0.0081  0.0633   -0.0279  0.0639   -0.0223  0.0891   -0.0123   
  (0.1074)  (0.1122)   (0.1074)  (0.1123)  (0.1075)  (0.1125)  (0.1076)  (0.1128)  (0.1081)  (0.1144)   
dkid04  -0.1109 *  -0.4948  *** -0.11 *  -0.4857 *** -0.1237 **  -0.5085 *** -0.1235 **  -0.4795 *** -0.1215 **  -0.4717  ** 
   (0.0601)    (0.1834)     (0.0604)    (0.1840)    (0.0611)    (0.1833)    (0.0611)    (0.1844)    (0.0613)    (0.1849)    
dkid59  -0.1094 *  -0.1336   -0.1087 *  -0.1329  -0.1231 *  -0.1451  -0.1304 **  -0.1425  -0.1298 **  -0.1392   
  (0.0621)  (0.2188)   (0.0622)  (0.2189)  (0.0632)  (0.2191)  (0.0634)  (0.2199)  (0.0636)  (0.2197)   
dkid1015  -0.2195 ***  -0.0956     -0.2202 *** -0.0955    -0.2143 ***  -0.0716    -0.2251 *** -0.0586    -0.2208 ***  -0.0334    
   (0.0744)    (0.1667)     (0.0745)    (0.1667)    (0.0746)    (0.1673)    (0.0750)    (0.1677)    (0.0753)    (0.1690)    
d50  -3.6311 ***  -1.3738  *** -3.6299 ***  -3.6103 ***   -3.5538 *** -1.4266 *** -3.5738 ***     
  (0.3217)  (0.3174)   (0.3256)    (0.3328)    (0.3566)  (0.3233)  (0.3805)      
d60  -3.1728 ***  -1.1951  *** -3.1649 *** 0.2303    -3.1761 ***  0.0758    -3.1167 *** -1.1622 *** -3.1414 ***  0.3249    
   (0.2667)    (0.2381)     (0.2823)    (0.1940)    (0.2867)    (0.1857)    (0.3096)    (0.2413)    (0.3398)    (0.2133)    
d70  -2.7993 ***  -0.9609 *** -2.7894 *** 0.4815 **  -2.8007 ***  0.3255   -2.7077 *** -0.8612 *** -2.6362 ***  0.6627 *** 
  (0.2174)  (0.1825)   (0.2420)  (0.2266)  (0.2406)  (0.2103)  (0.2763)  (0.1896)  (0.3136)  (0.2515)   
d80  -2.0829 ***  -0.6306  *** -2.0751 *** 0.8033 *** -2.0871 ***  0.6722 *** -2.0068 *** -0.5463 *** -1.8617 ***  0.9949  *** 
   (0.1734)    (0.1381)     (0.1964)    (0.2621)    (0.2029)    (0.2514)    (0.2409)    (0.1451)    (0.2845)    (0.2812)    
d90  -1.6344 ***  -0.2102 **  -1.6293 *** 1.2025 *** -1.6341 ***  1.0922 *** -1.5689 *** -0.2027 *  -1.4718 ***  1.2961 *** 
  (0.1426)  (0.1051)   (0.1612)  (0.3014)  (0.1749)  (0.2990)  (0.2150)  (0.1057)  (0.2577)  (0.3086)   
d00  -1.3866 ***        -1.3833 *** 1.4074 *** -1.3794 ***  1.3087 *** -1.3297 ***      -1.2775 ***  1.4701  *** 
   (0.1394)          (0.1534)    (0.3209)    (0.1691)    (0.3193)    (0.2064)         (0.2470)    (0.3259)    
_cons  2.7904  1.1529  *** 2.7971   -0.2162  2.6634   -0.3063  2.7962  0.9811 *** 2.8597   -0.4057   
   (.)    (0.1536)     (.)    (0.3514)    (.)    (0.3531)    (.)    (0.1819)    (.)    (0.3738)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time and regional dummies included.           Table A12. Heckman Selectivity Model - First stage - Dependent variable: employment - Nonwhites (Ref. Table 10) 
                  
   Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
   1 - Married  2 - Unmarried  3 - Married  4 - Unmarried  5 - Married  6 - Unmarried  7 - Married  8 - Unmarried  9 - Married  10 - Unmarried 
exper  -0.003  0.0031   -0.002  0.0018  0.0273 * 0.039 **  0.0037  0.0167   -0.0169  0.0118   
  (0.0044)  (0.0054)   (0.0065)  (0.0085)  (0.0151)  (0.0161)  (0.0244)  (0.0280)  (0.0335)  (0.0387)   
expersq/100                       -0.0954 **  -0.1369 **  -0.0328    -0.0878    0.0276    -0.0661    
                        (0.0455)    (0.0581)    (0.0804)    (0.1065)    (0.1131)    (0.1524)    
YSM  0.0461 ***  0.0296  *** 0.0474 *** 0.0283 *** 0.0464 ***  0.0308 *** 0.0252 * 0.0151  -0.0145  -0.0419   
  (0.0057)  (0.0082)   (0.0087)  (0.0105)  (0.0057)  (0.0083)  (0.0144)  (0.0130)  (0.0453)  (0.0401)   
YSM2/100                                           0.1462    0.2324    
                                            (0.1658)    (0.1497)    
YSM_x_exper/100        -0.0076  0.0089      0.2422  0.2149  0.7509  0.4384   
       (0.0375)  (0.0464)      (0.1588)  (0.1664)  (0.5454)  (0.5909)   
YSM_x_expersq/100                                 -0.0061    -0.0053    -0.0202    -0.0098    
                                  (0.0045)    (0.0055)    (0.0160)    (0.0207)    
YSM2_x_exper/100              -0.0177   -0.0117   
              (0.0182)   (0.0192)   
YSM2_x_expersq/100                                           0.0005    0.0002    
                                            (0.0005)    (0.0006)    
degree  0.6016 *** 0.6858  *** 0.5992 *** 0.6875 *** 0.5926 *** 0.7037 *** 0.6031 *** 0.7135 *** 0.6057 *** 0.7101  *** 
  (0.0681)  (0.1000)   (0.0691)  (0.1004)  (0.0683)  (0.1005)  (0.0693)  (0.1020)  (0.0695)  (0.1020)   
a_level  0.3406 ***  0.219  **  0.3393 *** 0.2195 **  0.3331 ***  0.2195 **  0.3356 *** 0.2159 **  0.3386 ***  0.236  ** 
   (0.0626)    (0.0908)     (0.0629)    (0.0908)    (0.0627)    (0.0908)    (0.0630)    (0.0912)    (0.0632)    (0.0921)    
o_level  0.2451 ***  -0.0513    0.244 *** -0.052  0.2376 **  -0.0562  0.2403 **  -0.0696  0.2429 ***  -0.0411   
  (0.0932)  (0.1188)   (0.0933)  (0.1188)  (0.0933)  (0.1188)  (0.0935)  (0.1192)  (0.0938)  (0.1202)   
dkid04  -0.1321 ***  0.2887     -0.1334 *** 0.2876    -0.147 ***  0.2718    -0.143 *** 0.2543    -0.1432 ***  0.2587    
   (0.0478)    (0.2414)     (0.0482)    (0.2414)    (0.0484)    (0.2411)    (0.0485)    (0.2412)    (0.0486)    (0.2413)    
dkid59  -0.0178  -0.0079   -0.0191  -0.0079  -0.0352   0.0058  -0.0377   0.005  -0.0382   0.0211   
  (0.0483)  (0.1972)   (0.0488)  (0.1971)  (0.0491)  (0.1977)  (0.0494)  (0.1977)  (0.0495)  (0.1983)   
dkid1015  -0.0604    -0.1234     -0.0597    -0.1233    -0.0587    -0.0926    -0.0681    -0.0864    -0.0656    -0.0789    
   (0.0585)    (0.1459)     (0.0586)    (0.1459)    (0.0586)    (0.1462)    (0.0589)    (0.1463)    (0.0591)    (0.1467)    
d50  -1.8762 ***        -1.8507 ***      -1.8761 ***     
  (0.3672)         (0.3690)      (0.3819)      
d60  -1.4001 ***  0.1681     0.4692    0.1758    -1.3877 ***  0.1528    0.4666    0.1943    -1.3921 ***  0.3293    
   (0.1704)    (0.4503)     (0.3195)    (0.4520)    (0.1705)    (0.4509)    (0.3248)    (0.4535)    (0.1714)    (0.4711)    
d70  -1.1509 ***  0.4789   0.7137 **  0.4959   -1.1557 ***  0.4366  0.7138 **  0.5444   -1.1515 ***  0.7824   
  (0.1314)  (0.4580)   (0.3287)  (0.4664)  (0.1314)  (0.4589)  (0.3342)  (0.4682)  (0.1379)  (0.4991)   
d80  -0.7948 ***  0.63     1.0696 *** 0.6467    -0.8033 ***  0.5943    1.0718 *** 0.7061    -0.7894 ***  1.0034  * 
   (0.0952)    (0.4774)     (0.3470)    (0.4853)    (0.0953)    (0.4783)    (0.3519)    (0.4872)    (0.1053)    (0.5191)    
d90  -0.4007 *** 1.0119  **  1.4653 *** 1.0264 ** -0.4046 *** 0.9747 *  1.4631 *** 1.0729 ** -0.3948 *** 1.3107  ** 
  (0.0765)  (0.5011)   (0.3603)  (0.5067)  (0.0765)  (0.5018)  (0.3650)  (0.5082)  (0.0789)  (0.5317)   
d00       1.3072  **  1.8672 *** 1.319 **       1.2799 **  1.8589 *** 1.3585 ***      1.5281  *** 
        (0.5161)     (0.3699)    (0.5198)         (0.5167)    (0.3746)    (0.5211)         (0.5394)    
_cons  0.907 ***  -0.9324    -0.9713 ** -0.9326   0.7383 ***  -1.0821 *  -0.9469 ** -1.0259 *  1.0579 *** -1.075  * 
   (0.1631)    (0.5748)     (0.3992)    (0.5748)    (0.1815)    (0.5785)    (0.4326)    (0.5887)    (0.2648)    (0.6224)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses. Time and regional dummies included.           Table A13. Education and labour market entrants - 1. Regional dummies 2. First stage of Heckman Selectivity Model (Ref. Table 11) 
             
  Probit estimates - Dependent variable: employment   Heckman Selectivity Model - Dependent variable: log hourly wage  
 Whites  Nonwhites Whites Nonwhites 
   12   345678  
   Education entrants  LM entrants  Education entrants LM  entrants Education entrants  LM entrants  Education entrants  LM entrants 
North_East -0.1172 -0.307 -0.3118 -0.2279 -0.0981 -0.0079 -0.0271 -0.0853   
  (0.1749)  (0.2323)  (0.2806)  (0.1987)     (0.0833)  (0.1146)  (0.1322)  (0.1093)   
North_West  -0.1244    -0.2567    -0.2354    -0.1922    -0.0299    0.1018    -0.0563    -0.1156    
   (0.1271)    (0.1580)    (0.2039)    (0.1376)    (0.0598)    (0.0812)    (0.0913)    (0.0721)    
Yorks_Hum  0.0183  -0.2645 *  -0.1168  -0.1426     -0.0474   0.0064  -0.1437  -0.0688   
  (0.1361)  (0.1563)  (0.2042)  (0.1389)     (0.0592)  (0.0758)  (0.0887)  (0.0688)   
East_Mids  -0.0328    -0.0697    -0.1073    0.0836    -0.0363    0.0745    -0.1175    -0.0466    
   (0.1397)    (0.1698)    (0.2132)    (0.1579)    (0.0638)    (0.0756)    (0.0899)    (0.0780)    
West_Mids -0.004   -0.356 **  -0.3553 *  -0.2135     -0.0227   0.119   -0.0245   -0.0812   
  (0.1380)  (0.1532)  (0.1955)  (0.1338)     (0.0622)  (0.0764)  (0.0851)  (0.0675)   
Eastern  0.1052    0.1203    0.0214    0.2192    0.1088** **  0.155 **  0.0918    0.1406  ** 
   (0.1207)    (0.1409)    (0.2151)    (0.1508)    (0.0532)    (0.0606)    (0.0887)    (0.0711)    
London  0.0165  -0.2319 **  -0.1649  -0.1273 * 0.2447 ***  0.3886 ***  0.135 * 0.1199  ** 
  (0.1073)  (0.1142)  (0.1879)  (0.1222)     (0.0485)  (0.0554)  (0.0801)  (0.0602)   
South_East  0.1368    0.0625    0.0943    0.2678 *  0.1282 ***  0.3036 ***  0.1233    0.1349  ** 
   (0.1095)    (0.1287)    (0.2049)    (0.1424)    (0.0477)    (0.0554)    (0.0851)    (0.0676)    
South_West  0.2548 **  0.0007  0.1244  0.3291    -0.062  0.0046   -0.0484  0.0499   
  (0.1293)  (0.1610)  (0.2581)  (0.1921)     (0.0541)  (0.0714)  (0.1009)  (0.0847)   
Wales  0.1001    0.0534    0.1073    0.1113    -0.1051    -0.1773 *  -0.07    -0.0703    
   (0.2007)    (0.2438)    (0.2971)    (0.2232)    (0.0852)    (0.0974)    (0.1206)    (0.1124)    
                       Exogenous variables used in the first stage 
dkid04                       -0.1806 **  -0.1284 *  -0.1725 **  -0.1078  * 
                        (0.0855)    (0.0763)    (0.0791)    (0.0584)    
dkid59           -0.1036   -0.1293   0.0335   -0.0571   
            (0.0880)  (0.0805)  (0.0764)  (0.0597)   
dkid1015                       -0.1324    -0.2135 **  -0.0562    -0.0407    
                        (0.0899)    (0.0940)    (0.0807)    (0.0701)    
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significant level. Standard errors in parentheses.            
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